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The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or
"One Good Loophole Deserves Another"
Russell Korobkin, J.D.*
Enacted in 1974, the federal Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA)1 has been a major roadblock to advocates of increased
regulation of health insurance benefits in the era of "managed care."
Originally drafted as a pension law, ERISA, as enacted, applies to all fringe
benefits provided by private employers to their employees. The statute
shields benefit plans, including health insurance, from state regulation in
two ways. First, ERISA's "preemption" clause prohibits state laws that
"relate to" employee benefit plans.2 Second, although ERISA's "savings
clause" exempts state laws that "regulate insurance" from the statute's
preemptive force, 3 this exception is in turn limited by the "deemer clause,"
which prevents state insurance regulations from reaching employer health
care benefits plans (EHBPs) that are self-insured,4 as opposed to those that
purchase insurance coverage from a third party. Put another way, ERISA
obstructs state regulation on two levels: The statute partially shields all
EHBPs from state regulation, and self-insured EHBPs enjoy an enhanced
level of protection.
A large chorus of critics has lodged two different types of complaints
about ERISA. On one hand, critics contend that managed care
arrangements threaten consumer health and that the expansion of these
insurance systems requires the government to police health insurers more
closely. ERISA preemption impedes possible state regulatory efforts. On
* Professor of Law, UCLA and Faculty Associate, UCLA Center for Health Policy
Research. Comments on earlier drafts from Tom Baker, John Day, Mark Hall, Peter
Jacobson,John Jacobi, Bill Sage, Rich Saver, and workshop participants at the UCLA Center
for Health Policy Research are gratefully acknowledged. Invaluable research assistance was
provided by Heather Richardson.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000)).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
3. Id. § 1144(b) (2) (A).
4. Id. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
5. See, e.g., Robert Covington, Amending ERISA's Preemption Scheme, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
1
Korobkin: The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or "One Good Loophole Deserves Another"
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2005
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
the other hand, to the extent that ERISA's savings clause enables state
regulation of managed care to avoid preemption, critics complain that
ERISA creates an inequitable two-tiered regulatory system, in which
employees in "insured" plans receive protections of state law denied to
employees in "self-insured" plans.6
In the past three terms, two important United States Supreme Court
decisions, Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran and Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans
v. Miller," expanded the scope of ERISA's savings clause, giving states
greater latitude to regulate managed care. A third decision, Aetna Health
Inc. v. Davila,9 added to the significance of Rush Prudential. At the same
time, the Court did not change its interpretation of the deemer clause: In
fact, there have been no Supreme Court rulings dealing with the deemer
clause since 1990.10 The result is that, as the scope of ERISA preemption
has contracted, the gap in regulatory protections enjoyed by employees in
insured and self-insured plans has expanded. An employer's decision
about whether to purchase third-party insurance or to self-insure its
employees' health care expenses has taken on increasing significance,
creating two competing incentives. Employers who wish to avoid the costs
associated with state regulation have a greater incentive to establish self-
insured EHBPs, and the supporters of regulation have more incentive than
ever to fight self-insurance.
A change in federal law would moot this issue. Congress could amend
ERISA to provide equal legal treatment for employees in insured and self-
insured EHBPs, or the courts could reinterpret the savings and deemer
POL'Y 1 (1999); Mark A. Edwards, Plan Protections for ERISA Self-Insured Employee Welfare
Benefit Plan Participants: New Possibilities for State Action in the Event of Plan Failure, 1997 Wis. L.
REV. 351; Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA and Managed Care: The Law Abhors a Vacuum, 29 J.
HEALTH L. 268 (1996); James Saya, Removing a Roadblock to Reforming Health Care: New York
State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Company, 3
CONN. INS. L.J. 127 (1997); Jana K. Strain & Eleanor D. Kinney, The Road Paved with Good
Intentions: Problems and Potential for Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance Under ERISA, 31 Loy.
U. CHI. L.J. 29 (1999).
6. See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 5; Troy Paredes, Stop-Loss Insurance, State Regulation, and
ERISA: Defining the Scope of Federal Preemption, 34 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 233 (1997); William H.
Pitsenberger, "An Apparently Irrational Distinction ": A Suggestion for Using Equal Protection
Arguments To Overcome Conflicts in ERISA Preemption, 32 J. HEALTH L. 307 (1999); Strain &
Kinney, supra note 5.
7. 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
8. 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003).
9. 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).
10. That case was FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
V:I1 (2005)
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clauses in a way that would eliminate or minimize the distinction. Neither
of these scenarios is likely in the near future, however. Although a federal
"Patients' Bill of Rights" that includes amendments to ERISA might one
day be enacted, none of the leading legislative proposals would eliminate
special protections for self-insured health benefits plans. A change in the
relevant judicial interpretations of ERISA is even less likely because the
Congress that enacted ERISA clearly intended for the statute to protect
self-insured benefit plans from state regulation.
With the statutory difference in treatment between insured and self-
insured plans unlikely to disappear any time soon, the reach of state
regulation of health insurance rests on how many businesses choose to self-
insure their EHBPs. At present, the number is surprisingly high, owing in
part to the popularity of a loophole in ERISA that enables employers
without sufficient resources to bear the risk of their employees' health care
costs to purchase "stop-loss" insurance-a product that reimburses the
employer for costs above a specified threshold amount-and still qualify
for ERISA's protection from state regulatory requirements.
ERISA also contains a second, less well-understood loophole, however,
that states can exploit to minimize the number of EHBPs able to invoke
ERISA as a shield against state regulation of health insurance: ERISA's text
and structure permit states to regulate the terms and conditions of stop-
loss insurance. Some states have already taken advantage of this loophole
to a limited extent, although none has exploited it as fully as they might.
Correctly interpreted, ERISA provides state regulators with the tools to
effectively staunch employers' ability to manipulate the statute's
preemption provision for the sole purpose of avoiding state insurance
mandates.
This Article explores the battle between employers who seek to
maximize and state regulators who seek to minimize the scope of ERISA
preemption. Part I describes the relevant statutory structure of ERISA and
the implications of that structure, with emphasis on the three recent
Supreme Court decisions that increased the legal importance of the
distinction between insured and self-insured health plans. Part II describes
how the availability of stop-loss insurance allows employers to exploit a
loophole in ERISA's deemer clause in order to avoid exposure to state
regulation. Part II also defends the role federal courts have played in
permitting the exploitation of this loophole on the ground that it is
consistent with ERISA's text and its underlying congressional intent. Part
III describes how a loophole in ERISA's savings clause allows state
regulators to close the deemer clause loophole. It argues that, as is true for
the deemer clause loophole, the text and underlying intent of ERISA
3
Korobkin: The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or "One Good Loophole Deserves Another"
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2005
YALE JOURNAL OF HEALTH POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS
counsels that the courts should not intervene to block the exploitation of
this loophole. When it enacted ERISA, Congress established a muddled set
of rules. Properly understood, ERISA's ground rules should allow
employers and regulators to battle to a stalemate.
I. THE INSURANCE-SELF-INSURANCE GAP
A. ERISA's Structure
In the early 1970s, as a response to a number of failures of employer-
sponsored pension funds, Congress proposed to replace a patchwork of
state pension plan regulations with a federal regulatory structure." In the
process of drafting ERISA, however, Congress expanded the proposal's
scope to preempt state laws that relate to any "employee benefits plan,"
including employer-provided health insurance.12 But while ERISA, as
enacted, provides detailed substantive regulations of pension plans, it
includes virtually no substantive regulation of EHBPs,13 leaving such plans
largely unregulated, save for a few recently-enacted federal health benefits
regulations, such as minimum hospital length-of-stay rules for childbirth,'
mental health care coverage requirements,' 5 and limits on preexisting
condition exclusions.1
6
There is one significant exception, however, to ERISA's preemption of
state laws that relate to health care plans. The statute's savings clause
protects from preemption state laws that "regulate[] insurance." 7
Although there is no legislative history explaining the addition of the
11. See, e.g., Patricia Butler, ERISA Preemption Manual for State Health Policy Makers, 2000
NAT'L AcAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL'Y 5.
12. Although most ERISA benefits plans are employer-sponsored, other entities, such as
labor unions, can also sponsor such plans. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000).
13. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 91 (1983). ERISA and its regulations
do provide for a number of procedural regulations of EHBPs. For example, administrators
of EHBPs are fiduciaries and have a range of obligations as such, see 29 U.S.C. § 1002
(2000); EHBPs must provide summary plan descriptions to participants, see 29 C.F.R.
2520.102-3 (2004); and ERISA provides plan participants with a federal cause of action to
recover promised benefits that the plan fails to provide, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2000).
14. Newborns' and Mothers' Health Protection Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (2000).
15. Mental Health Parity Act of 1996, 29 U.S.C. § 1185a (2000), 42 U.S.C. § 3
0 0 gg-5
(2000).
16. 26 U.S.C. § 9801 (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 1181 (2000); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (2000).
17. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (A) (2000).
V: 1 (2005)
4
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 5 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol5/iss1/2
THE BATTLE OVER SELF-INSURED HEALTH PLANS
savings clause,1" its presence clearly suggests that Congress did not intend
for the preemption principle to go so far as to subvert traditional, core
areas of state regulatory authority.
In ERISA's text, however, the savings clause is followed by the deemer
clause,19 with the latter limiting the scope of the former. The deemer
clause provides that employee benefit plans "shall [not] be deemed to be
an insurance company or other insurer.., or to be engaged in the
business of insurance.., for purposes of any law of any State purporting to
regulate insurance companies [or] insurance contracts ... ,,20 Thus, ERISA
preserves the traditional right of states to regulate the insurance industry,
but those regulations may not extend to cover EHBPs, even though EHBPs
often serve an insurance function and might otherwise find themselves
subject to state laws governing insurance.2
The deemer clause's limitation on the scope of the savings clause
makes sense only in the context of one of ERISA's underlying goals:
providing a uniform legal structure for employers that operate in multiple
states.2 Neither ERISA nor any other federal law requires employers to
provide any fringe benefits. ERISA's supporters thought that by protecting
large, multi-state employers from the burden of dealing with multiple sets
of regulatory requirements, employers would be more likely to provide
fringe benefits.23 The end result of Congress's attempt to balance the
competing goals of deferring to traditional state functions and promoting
legal uniformity is that states may regulate insurance companies, even if
such regulations indirectly "relate to" EHBPs because such plans purchase
insurance, but states may not directly regulate the plans themselves.
Supporters of increased regulation criticize as inequitable or outright
illogical the fact that EHBPs enjoy greater freedom from state control than
18. Id.; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 745 (1985).
19. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (B) (2000).
20. Id.
21. Cf HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. & LABOR, ERISA OVERSIGHT REPORT OF THE PENSION TASK
FORCE OF THE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR STANDARDS 10 (Comm. Print 1977) (concluding that the
deemer clause "create[s] what may amount to a legal fiction in a given circumstance" in
which a plan engages in insurance activities).
22. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 142 (1990) (describing ERISA's
purpose of ensuring that benefit plans are not subject to divergent regulatory schemes in
different states); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 46-47 (1987) (same).
23. Donald T. Bogan, ERISA: The Savings Clause, 502 Implied Preemption, and State Law
Remedies, 42 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 105, 118 n.51 (2001); Farrell, supra note 5; Patricia M.
Ochmann, Managed Care Organization Manage To Escape Liability: Why Issues of Quantity v.
Quality Lead to ERISA 's Inequitable Preemption of Claims, 34 AKRON L. REV. 571, 580 (2001).
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do insurance companies when the two types of organizations serve the
same purpose of guaranteeing the provision of needed medical care.4 This
disparate treatment is not irrational, however, because state laws regulating
insurance companies impose a less severe administrative burden on multi-
state employers than would state laws directly regulating EHBPs
themselves. For a multi-state employer that wishes to self-insure its
employees' health care benefits, inconsistent state regulatory
requirements, if permissible, would impose upon it the cost of developing
a separate insurance plan for its employees in each state. 5 If that multi-
state employer purchases insurance for its employees, it might have to
purchase different insurance policies for employees in each state, but the
employer need not concern itself with the task of complying with different
state regulations-such responsibility would fall on the insurance
companies.
Admittedly, this distinction can appear minor, especially given that
self-insured employers can (and often do) hire insurance companies to
26design and administrate their self-insured EHBPs. In other words,
conflicting state regulations of EHBPs would not cause CEOs of large
national companies to spend their late-night hours struggling to master the
regulatory intricacies of all fifty states. But qualitative distinctions between
relative burdens created by regulation must be made in any structure of
federal preemption. Otherwise, all state regulation would be preempted,
because all state laws can be said to have some attenuated effect on
preempted subject matter. For example, without such qualitative
distinctions, ERISA presumably would preempt state food handling laws
because such regulations affect the available options and costs to employee
24. See, e.g., Margaret G. Farrell, ERISA Preemption and Regulation of Managed Health Care:
The Case for Managed Federalism, 23 AM. J.L. & MED. 251, 264 (1997); Douglas J. Witten,
Regulation of "Downstream" and Direct Risk Contracting by Health Care Providers: The Quest for
Consumer Protection and a Level Playing Field, 23 AM.J.L. & MED. 449, 466 (1997); cf FMC
Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 65-66 (1990) (Stevens,J., dissenting) (stating that there is no
rational reason to permit employee benefit plans to contract for certain rights vis-a-vis
employees when state law prohibits similarly situated insurance companies from contracting
for the same rights).
25. Of course, many multi-state employers chose to provide different health care plans
to their employees in different states notwithstanding the administrative costs of doing so.
See, e.g., David Reich-Hale, Big Employers Self-Funding HMO Costs, NAT'L UNDERWRITER: LIFE &
HEALTH / FIN. SERVICES EDITION, Oct. 11, 1999, at S-21 (describing one large employer that
self-insures its employee's medical care in one state but purchases third-party insurance in
others).
26. Farrell, supra note 5.
V:1 (2005)
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benefit plans that wish to provide lunch as a fringe benefit.
27
Despite the fact that ERISA's differential treatment of EHBPs and
third-party insurance companies that sell health insurance to EHBPs is
logically defensible, this differential treatment leads to a troubling inequity
for employees. If an EHBP purchases third-party insurance, it is classified
as an "insured" plan, and state regulations govern any set of benefits that it
purchases. If a plan self-insures, however, these same state regulations do
not apply. Consequently, employees in an insured plan benefit from state
regulatory protections, whereas similarly-situated employees in a self-
insured plan do not.
This apparent inequity is perhaps made more objectionable by the fact
that few employees know whether their EHBP is insured or self-insured.
"Self-insured" rarely means "self-administrated," as most self-insured plans
hire a third-party administrator (TPA) for their EHBP (and, as noted
above, TPA services are often provided by insurance companies) .28 This
means that most employees in self-insured EHBPs submit claim forms to
and have their covered medical expenses paid by an entity other than their
employer, oblivious to the distinction that the TPA is paying claims with
the employer's money rather than with its own.29
The extent of the consequence to employees of whether their benefits
plan is insured or self-insured became clear in 1985 (if not before) when'
the United States Supreme Court decided Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts." Metropolitan Life concerned a Massachusetts law requiring
group health insurance policies to provide a minimum level of benefits for
mental health care. When two insurance companies sold policies to
employee benefits plans without such a benefit, the Massachusetts Attorney
General brought suit. The United States Supreme Court upheld a
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts judgment for the State31 on the
ground that the Massachusetts mandate was an insurance regulation
protected from preemption by the savings clause. In so doing, the Court
rejected the insurance companies' argument that the savings clause should
27. See Russell Korobkin, The Failed Jurisprudence of Managed Care and How To Fix It, 51
UCLA L. REV. 457, 505 (2003).
28. BARRY F. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 423 (2d ed. 2000).
29. See, e.g., Ins. Bd. v. Muir, 819 F.2d 408, 409 (3d Cir. 1987) (noting that employees
received Blue Cross and Blue Shield claim forms and received reimbursement from Blue
Cross and Blue Shield but the Blues were providing administrative services for a self-insured
plan).
30. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
31. Id. at 734-35.
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be read narrowly to protect only "traditional" insurance laws, such as those
regulating insurance company reserves, and not "innovative" benefits
mandates.2
The Metropolitan Life court noted that, as a result of its ruling,
employees in insured plans and employees in self-insured plans would be
treated differently under state laws, because the deemer clause would
prohibit Massachusetts from applying the mandate to self-insured EHBPs.
33
To the extent that it found this distinction problematic, however, the
Court laid the blame on Congress's doorstep for structuring ERISA in the
way that it did.34 This dicta was reaffirmed as holding five years later in FMC
Corp. v. Holliday,3' the only deemer clause case the Supreme Court has ever
decided. FMC Corp. concerned a self-insured EHBP with a subrogation
clause, requiring the plan member to reimburse the plan for any medical
care costs that the plan paid if the member recovered those costs in a
liability action against a third party.36 A plan member who recovered such
expenses from a third-party refused to reimburse the plan on the ground
that a state law prohibited subrogation. 37 The Court held that ERISA
preempted the state law because it was an insurance regulation, and as
such "[did] not reach self-funded employee benefits plans because the
plans may not be deemed to be insurance companies, other insurers, or
engaged in the business of insurance for purposes of such state laws.,
38
State mandated benefits laws, like the law at issue in Metropolitan Life,9
were enacted as a reaction to the rise of managed care from the 1970s to
the 1990s. The speed with which managed care arrangements replaced
traditional indemnity insurance as the dominant form of health insurance
led to a nation-wide backlash against the perceived aggressiveness of
insurer attempts to contain costs by limited benefits and services.40 State
legislators introduced bills by the hundreds requiring insurers to cover a
wide-range of benefits and otherwise mandating the terms of insurance
contracts, and nearly every state passed a variety of specific mandates, if not
32. Id. at 739-47.
33. Id. at 747.
34. Id. at 747 & n.25 (stating that the court "merely give[s] life to a distinction created
by Congress in the 'deemer clause'" and citing legislative history).
35. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
36. Id. at 54.
37. Id. at 55.
38. Id. at 61.
39. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 728.
40. Ochmann, supra note 23.
V:l (2005)
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an entire "Patient's Bill of Rights." a' One researcher estimates that the
number of state mandates rose from virtually none in 1970 to 850 in 1991,
with the largest rate of increase coming before 1988.42
The explosion of mandated benefits laws protected from preemption
by the savings clause means the stakes associated with an EHBP's choice
between purchasing third-party insurance or self-insuring its members'
medical care costs are high. By self-insuring, an employer can avoid paying
the cost of dozens of state insurance mandates, from in vitro fertilization to
chiropractic treatment, as well as related state insurance policy regulations,
such as the law at issue in FMC Corp. prohibiting subrogation by insurance
providers. While no one mandate is likely to significantly increase the cost
of health insurance, the aggregate affect of mandates can be quite
significant.43 These savings, available only to self-insured plans, flow straight
to the EHBP's-and thus the employer's-bottom line.44 Thus, the deemer
clause not only affords different treatment to employers ex post based on
the employer's decision to insure or self-insure, it also affects employers' ex
ante incentives when making that choice. As a result, self-insurance is
attractive not only to the small percentage of employers that operate in
multiple jurisdictions 5 and might wish to minimize the administrative costs
of insuring employees subject to inconsistent state rules, but also to any
41. See Russell Korobkin, The Efficiency of Managed Care "Patient Protection" Laws:
Incomplete Contracts, Rounded Rationality, and Market Failure, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 17-18
(1999).
42. Gail A. Jensen, State Mandates on Private Insurance, CATO REGULATION: THE REVIEW OF
BUSINESS & GOVERNMENT, Aug. 1, 1992, http://www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/
regl 5n4g.html.
43. See, e.g., Renate M. Nellich, Executive Partnerships in Reinsurance, NAT'L UNDERWRITER:
LIFE & HEALTH / FIN. SERVICES EDITION, Apr. 20, 1998, at 10 (reporting that benefits
expenses among U.S. businesses grew from thirty percent to nearly forty-two percent of
payroll between 1975 and 1998, with half the increase due to new mandated benefits).
44. In a perfectly functioning market in which employees had complete information
and unlimited cognitive abilities, employers would have no incentive to provide less
attractive fringe benefits to their employees than do competitors, because the employer
would either have to spend the savings on other forms of employee compensation or risk
losing its best employees. It is more plausible to assume, however, that while the availability
of health care coverage affects many employees' choice ofjobs, few employees consider the
details of competing employers' health care plans when making such choices. See generally
Korobkin, supra note 41.
45. This percentage of employers has been reported to be as low as five percent. See Gail
A. Jensen et al., State Insurance Regulation and Employers' Decisions to Self-Insure, 62 J. RISK &
INS. 185, 200 (1995) (describing the composition of their employer data set as including
predominantly single-state employers).
9
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employers that wish to avoid costly regulatory protections that states
require insurance companies to provide.46
B. The Supreme Court Expands the Reach of the Savings Clause
As the above discussion explains, the broader the interpretation given
to ERISA's savings clause, the larger the gap between the legal protections
afforded employees enrolled in self-insured and insured health benefits
plans, and consequently the greater the incentive of employers to self-
insure their medical benefits plans. In its last three terms, the Supreme
Court decided two cases specifically involving the breadth of the savings
clause in the context of health insurance and another that has indirect
implications for the savings clause's importance. The Court resolved these
disputes in ways that expand the savings clause's scope and importance.
Thus, an indirect effect of the Court's rulings in Rush Prudential HMO v.
Moran,4 '7 Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila," and Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v.
Miller49 is to increase the incentive of employers to self-insure.
1. Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran
Rush Prudential HMO concerned one of the 1990s' most popular
mandated benefits statutes, the status of which, under the savings clause,
was disputed by the lower federal courts.
One of the most controversial features of managed health care is
"utilization review," according to which a health insurer reviews treatments
proposed by physicians to determine whether they are "medically
necessary." ° If the insurer's representative determines that a procedure
does not satisfy the insurer's standard of medical necessity, the insurer
refuses to authorize payment for it. Although the patient may pay for the
treatment out of pocket, the costs of medical procedures that are
expensive enough to justify utilization review are prohibitive for most
patients, so a utilization review denial usually means that the patient will
not receive his desired treatment.
46. See, e.g., Peter Schmidt, Part I: The Basics of ERISA as It Relates to Health Plans, in EBRI
ISSUE BRIEF No. 167 (SPEcIAL REPORT SR-31), at 5 (1995) (reporting that the growing ranks
of self-insured plans are "influenced" by employer desire to escape expanding state
regulations).
47. 536 U.S. 355 (2002).
48. 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).
49. 123 S. Ct. 1471 (2003).
50. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 27, at 463.
V:I1 (2005)
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One contributing factor to the public backlash against the health
insurance industry in the 1990s was the perception that insurers were using
utilization review as a method of minimizing costs by denying legitimate
treatment requests." As a result, forty-one states enacted "external review"
statutes,52 which require health insurers to permit patients to appeal
adverse utilization review decisions to a neutral arbitrator and to pay for
the treatment if that arbitrator determines that the treatment is medically
necessary. Insurers challenged these regulations as preempted by ERISA,
and a "circuit split" resulted. The Seventh Circuit held that the savings
clause protected an Illinois external review statute. 53 Meanwhile, the Fifth
Circuit ruled that ERISA preempted a substantively identical Texas statute
because the remedies provided under the statute conflicted with ERISA's
remedy provisions. 54 The Fifth Circuit's rule would deny the protection of
state external review laws to any patient who receives his health insurance
through an EHBP, thus treating members of insured and self-insured plans
identically. The Seventh Circuit's rule would grant the same treatment to
external review statutes as to the mental health benefits mandate at issue in
Metropolitan Life, consequently providing rights to employees in insured
plans but not those in self-insured plans.
Over a sharp dissent by four justices, 55 the Supreme Court in 2002
upheld the Seventh Circuit's position that ERISA's savings clause protects
state external review statutes and that such statutes are not otherwise
preempted because they conflict with ERISA's remedy provisions. 6 The
decision was a major victory for supporters of managed care regulation. It
also expanded the legal and practical significance of an employer's
decision to self-insure its EHBP rather than purchase third-party insurance.
51. For an analysis of why it might make business sense for health insurers to engage in
such a strategy notwithstanding built-in market constraints on strategic underperformance
of contractual obligations, see Korobkin, supra note 41, at 29-44.
52. Mark C. Nielsen, Piercing the Preemptive Veil: Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran Opens
the Door for Additional State Regulation of Managed Care Organizations, 14 HEALTH L. 15, 15
(2002) (noting that external review statutes have been enacted by forty-one states and the
District of Columbia).
53. Moran v. Rush Prudential HMO, Inc., 230 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2000).
54. Corporate Health Ins., Inc. v. Texas Dep't of Ins., 215 F.3d 526 (5th Cir. 2000),
modified and reinstated by 314 F.3d 784.
55. Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 388 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist
andJustices Scalia and Kennedy joined Justice Thomas's dissent.
56. Id. at 385, 386.
11
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2. Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila
The Supreme Court's decision in Rush Prudential HMO permits states
to provide patients enrolled in insured (but not self-insured) EHBPs with
procedural protections from erroneous utilization review denials, which
has the indirect effect of providing EHBPs with a financial incentive to self-
insure. The Court's June 2004 decision in Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila"
further increased the incentive to self-insure by increasing the relative
importance to patients of the external review statutes permitted under
Rush Prudential HMO.
In theory, the legal system can adopt either (or both) of two
approaches to prevent health insurance providers from minimizing costs
by using the utilization review process to avoid providing services that
satisfy the underlying medical necessity standard. One approach to this
moral hazard problem relies on ex ante government regulation of services
as a prophylactic device. In the case of utilization review, external review
statutes serve this function. Providers are prevented by the external review
process from refusing to provide at the time of sickness the level of care
promised at the time of enrollment. The alternative approach relies on the
threat of private litigation and resulting sanctions to deter careless or
strategic behavior. Knowing that they can be sued by the patient for
resulting damages should they improperly deny coverage of a requested
treatment, providers will have an incentive to take appropriate care to
furnish the services to which patients are entitled. They will also have an
incentive in close cases to err on the side of providing questionable
treatment to avoid the risk of litigation.
ERISA's remedy provisions permit a member of an EHBP to bring a
lawsuit under ERISA to "recover benefits due to him under the terms of his
plan," to "enforce his rights under the terms of the plan," or to "clarify his
rights to future benefits under the terms of the plan. 5 8 However, the
Supreme Court has interpreted this portion of the statute narrowly, ruling
that aggrieved plan participants can bring suit under the statute for the
value of benefits improperly withheld but not for compensatory or punitive
damages. 59 The significance of this limitation for the utilization review
process depends on whether a patient improperly denied medically
necessary medical treatment may bring suit under specific state statutes or
general state tort law that permits a broader range of remedies.
57. 124 S. Ct. 2488 (2004).
58. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (1) (B) (2000).
59. Mass. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 144 (1985).
V:I1 (2005)
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Prior to 2000, most lower courts to address this question had held that
ERISA's remedial provisions preempted all related state claims and, thus,
an insurer's legal risk of a utilization review denial was limited to the cost
of the desired treatment.60 Under this rule, the direct financial incentive to
conduct the utilization review process carefully and generously is limited,
which increases the attractiveness of ex ante prophylactic regulation
embodied in external review statutes to critics of managed care.
The Supreme Court's Pegram v. Herdrich6' decision in 2000 cast doubt
on the conventional wisdom that ERISA preempts state law claims against
health insurers arising out of utilization review denials. At issue in the case
was whether an HMO violates its fiduciary duties under ERISA by basing
physician compensation in part on how successful physicians are at limiting
resource usage for patient care.f In answering this question in the
negative, the Court explained that allowing a patient who is denied
medically necessary care to maintain a cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty would essentially duplicate her existing right to challenge
63
medical necessity determinations under state law. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court" and three federal circuit courts,6 - along with
66commentators, 66 read the Pegram dicta as signaling that ERISA does not
preempt state law causes of action arising from utilization review denials.
In last term's decision in Davila, the Supreme Court reviewed and
reversed the Fifth Circuit's decision to this effect, validating the pre-Pegram
conventional wisdom that, when a patient receives health care coverage
through an EHBP, his ability to sue over a utilization review denial can be
brought only under ERISA. 67 The Court made no distinction in its opinion
between the rights of employees in insured and self-insured EHBPs,
despite the fact that it appears that one of the two plaintiffs in the case was
60. The leading case was Corcoran v. United Health Care, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.
1992). For a description of the state of the law prior to 2000, see Korobkin, supra note 27, at
494-97.
61. 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
62. Id. at 217.
63. Id. at 235.
64. Papps v. Asbel, 768 A.2d 1089 (Pa. 2001).
65. Cicio v. Does, 321 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2003); Land v. Cigna Healthcare of Fla., 339 F.3d
1286 (11th Cir. 2003); Roark v. Humana, Inc., 307 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2002). One circuit
disagreed with this reading of Pegram, DiFelice v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 346 F.3d 442 (3d
Cir. 2003), as did the dissenters in Rush Prudential, 536 U.S. at 388 (Thomas,J., dissenting).
66. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 27, at 520; Russell Korobkin, HMOs Get Authority To
Strike a Fair Balance, L.A. TIMES,June 14, 2000, at B9.
67. 124 S. Ct. at 2493.
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enrolled in an insured EHBP while the other was a member of a self-
insured EHBP. 8
In a concurring opinion, Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justice Breyer)
argued that the Court should consider revisiting its earlier decision that
read ERISA's remedial provisions so narrowly or, alternatively, that
Congress should rewrite the statute. 69 Unless and until this happens,
however, it now seems clear that state statutes requiring external review
provide the primary, if not the only, legal check on health insurance
providers using utilization review to minimize the cost of providing health
care, thus increasing the differential flexibility that self-insured EHBPs not
subject to external review laws enjoy relative to insured EHBPs. In other
words, Davila amplifies the difference in legal treatment of self-insured and
insured EHBPs established in Rush Prudential-increasing the desirability
of self-insurance to employers who want to maintain maximum flexibility
to reduce the costs of providing health care coverage and decreasing the
desirability of self-insurance to state regulators who wish to maximize the
extent of legal protection for employees.
3. Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller
In 2003, the Supreme Court followed its decision in Rush Prudential
with another decision specifically concerning the breadth of the savings
clause. As it did in Rush Prudential, the Court in Kentucky Ass'n again
68. The Court's opinion came in the consolidated cases of Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila
and Cigna Healthcare of Tex., Inc. v. Calad. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2492-93. According to Cigna
Healthcare's brief, Ruby Calad's EHBP was self-insured by her husband's employer, which
in turn "delegated certain administrative responsibilities for the plan to petitioner Cigna
Healthcare of Texas, Inc." Brief for Petitioner Cigna Healthcare of Texas, Inc. at 2, Davila
(No. 02-1845). According to the joint brief of respondents Davila and Calad, Juan Davila
"was a member of Aetna's HMO, which is not itself an 'ERISA plan."' Brief for Respondents
at 6, Davila (No. 02-1845). This language implies that Aetna, not Davila's employer, was the
risk bearing entity. The Supreme Court's opinion does not state whether the employees
were in insured or self-insured EHBPs-in fact, the difference between insured and self-
insured plans is mentioned nowhere in the opinion. The Court does state that the
employees' "respective plan sponsors had entered into agreements with [Aetna and Cigna]
to administer the plans." Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2493 (emphasis added). This language could be
read to imply that both insurance companies only administered the plans (and thus neither
was the actual risk-bearing entity), but the better reading is probably that the Court did not
think that whether risk was borne by the employees' employer or the insurance company
administrator was relevant to the question of the preemptive effect of ERISA's remedial
provisions.
69. Davila, 124 S. Ct. at 2503-04 (Ginsburg,J., concurring).
V:I1 (2005)
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favored state regulatory power over broad federal preemption under
ERISA.
At issue in Kentucky Ass'n were state "any willing provider" (AWP) laws,
which require health insurers doing business in the state to contract with
all physicians (or, in some cases other medical care providers such as
chiropractors or pharmacists) willing to provide care to an insurer's
customers in accordance with the insurer's standard terms and
conditions.7 0 At least half of the states have enacted some version of an
71AWP statute.
Most managed care organizations (MCOs) oppose AWP laws on the
ground that they take away a potent tool for containing health care costs.
By selectively contracting only with certain providers, MCOs can force
price concessions from those providers, both because they can guarantee a
large quantity of business to the selected providers, and because the
providers must worry that the MCO will refuse to contract with them at all
if they do not grant such concessions . Patients' advocates, on the other
hand, often support the laws on the grounds that they give patients greater
treatment options and that they allow patients who move from one
insurance plan to another the ability to maintain their pre-established
doctor-patient relationships.
73
As was the case with external review statutes, the circuit courts agreed
that AWP laws "relate to" ERISA plans and are subject to federal
preemption but split on the question of whether they are protected by the
savings clause.9 The Fourth and Sixth Circuits determined that AWP
statutes qualify as insurance regulations, and thus are saved;
7 5 the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits held that the laws fall outside the protection of the savings
clause because they regulate entities outside the insurance industry or
because they do not affect the allocation of risk between insurers and their
76customers.
70. Vickie Y. Brown & Barbara R. Hartung, Managed Care at the Crossroads: Can Managed
Care Organizations Survive Government Regulation?, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 25, 36 (1998); Butler,
supra note 11, at 67; Justin Goodyear, What Is an Employee Benefit Plan?: ERISA Preemption of
"Any Willing Provider" Laws AfterPegram, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1107, 1116 (2001).
71. Farrell, supra note 5, at 270.
72. See, e.g., Korobkin, supra note 27, at 510.
73. Id. at 509-10.
74. Id. at 511-12.
75. Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v. Nichols, 227 F.3d 352 (6th Cir. 2000); Stuart
Circle Hosp. Corp. v. Aetna Health Mgmt., 995 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Korobkin,
supra note 24, at 512.
76. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Nat'l Park Med. Ctr., 154 F.3d 812 (8th Cir. 1998);
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The Supreme Court, this time in a unanimous decision, followed the
circuit courts that gave a broader reading to the savings clause and held
that ERISA does not preempt the Kentucky statutes. In so doing, the Court
renounced the complicated, multi-part test for determining whether a
state law "regulates insurance" that it introduced in Metropolitan Life and
replaced it with a simpler, easier-to-satisfy test. Under the rule enunciated
in Kentucky Ass'n, in order to qualify as a law that regulates insurance and
therefore receives protection from the savings clause, the state law in
question need only be "specifically directed" at the insurance industry (as
opposed to being a law of general applicability) and "substantially affect"
an insurer's insurance practices (as opposed to being a law that affects
insurance companies only in their non-insurance-related capacities).7
4. The Implications of the Court's Savings Clause Jurisprudence
Since ERISA was enacted more than a quarter-century ago, the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence has tilted, on balance, in favor of
preemption.7 Going back as far as 1983, the Court has read the
preemption clause broadly, finding that ERISA preempts a wide range of
state laws because they either have a "reference to" or have a "connection
with" EHBPs.79 In its 1995 decision in New York State Conference of Blue Cross
and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Insurance Co.,8° the Court narrowed the
scope of ERISA preemption somewhat, but also suggested that the scope of
preemption would continue to be broad. The Court's decisions in Rush
Prudential HMO and Kentucky Ass'n reinforce this reading of Travelers,
because the Court declined to address the underlying assumption of its
holdings that the state laws at issue did in fact "relate to" ERISA plans, and
thus were the subject of preemption.
Texas Pharmacy Ass'n v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 105 F.3d 1035 (5th Cir. 1997); see also
Korobkin, supra note 24, at 512.
77. Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 1479 (2003).
78. The Court has drawn its share of criticism for this. See, e.g., Farrell, supra note 5;
Catherine L. Fisk, The Last Article About the Language of ERISA Preemption? A Case Study of the
Failure of Textualism, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 35 (1996); Korobkin, supra note 27; Saya, supra
note 5, at 160; Susan J. Stabile, Preemption of State Law by Federal Law: A Task for Congress or the
Courts?, 40 VILL. L. REv. 1, 31-35 (1995); Deborah J. Massaro, Comment, Removal of the
ERISA Preemption Shield: Will the Third Circuit's Approach Make a Difference? - In re U.S.
Healthcare, Inc., 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 585, 592-93 (2001); Nicole Weisenborn, Note, ERISA
Preemption and Its Effect on State Health Reform, 5 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 147 (1995).
79. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
80. 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
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But while the Court continues to read the preemption clause broadly,
it also continues to read the savings clause broadly. As a general statement,
it is fair to say that the Court has promoted federal authority through the
preemption clause, while simultaneously protecting state authority
through the savings clause. An unintended consequence of this doctrinal
approach is that it maximizes the gap in treatment that employees in self-
insured and insured plans receive under ERISA.
II. EXPLOITING THE DEEMER CLAUSE LOOPHOLE
Part I described how a broad interpretation of ERISA's savings clause
juxtaposed with ERISA's deemer clause creates a significant incentive for
EHBPs to self-insure their members' health care costs rather than purchase
third-party health insurance. No matter how great this incentive, however,
EHBPs will not choose to self-insure if they cannot afford to assume the
risk of catastrophic medical care claims in a given year. Stop-loss insurance
protects EHBPs from catastrophic losses, thus making self-insurance
feasible for even small employers and thereby facilitating widespread
avoidance of state insurance regulations.
By using stop-loss insurance to minimize insurance risk while
simultaneously avoiding state regulation, EHBPs exploit a loophole in
ERISA's statutory structure. To the chagrin of supporters of greater
regulation of health insurance, however, this loophole is consistent with
the plain language of ERISA, and it is not inconsistent with ERISA's
structure. Courts thus have properly refused to heed the calls of regulation
supporters to close the loophole, although their analyses often make the
issue much more complicated that it should be.
A. The Economics of Self-Insurance
A managed care organization or a traditional indemnity insurance
company that sells third-party health insurance provides two distinct
services. First, it administers the insurance plan, which includes
establishing contracts with medical care providers and reviewing and
paying covered claims. Second, it assumes the risk that in any given year its
customers will incur medical care costs that are higher than their actuarial,
average expected cost. This latter service is often described as bearing
"insurance risk."8' Insurance companies, of course, do not provide such
services for free. The premiums they charge can be understood as
consisting of the customer's expected medical care cost, plus an extra
81. Butler, supra note 11, at 62.
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amount to cover the costs of administration and insurance risk, including
the company's profit margin."
By self-insuring rather than purchasing insurance, employers, in
theory, can avoid the costs of paying a third-party insurer to provide
administrative services. In reality, many employers contract with third
parties to serve as TPAs and administer their health care benefits; 3 this is
true even of extremely large companies with tens of thousands of
814employees. Presumably, this is because TPAs' expertise in administration
makes it cheaper for self-insured EHBPs to contract for administrative
services rather than to provide them "in-house." This suggests that EHBPs
are unlikely to save substantially, if at all, on administrative costs by self-
insuring.85
Whether it is in an EHBP's interest to self-insure, then, depends on the
extent of the insurance risk that it would undertake. An EHBP with few
beneficiaries can expect a large variance in annual medical care costs. 86
The costs incurred by a single member who suffers a catastrophic illness
could be far greater than a plan's actuarially expected medical costs,
resulting in severe cash-flow problems or even insolvency. The risks
associated with extreme annual fluctuations decline as the size of the
EHBP increases; that is, the more members in an EHBP, the lower the
87expected annual variance of the plan's expenses. Insurance companies
have an advantage relative to individual employers in managing insurance
risk because they pool the individual risks of a large number of
customers. 88 Extremely large employers, however, have a pool of individual
82. Laurence Baker, Managed Care and Social Welfare: What Has Managed Care Really Done
to the U.S. Health Care System?, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HEALTH CARE REFORMS 35-39
(Huizhong Zhou ed., 2001).
83. Butler, supra note 11, at 90.
84. Id.
85. Cf. Jensen et al., supra note 45, at 187 (finding that "research suggests that...
administrative costs for self-insured plans are actually higher than those of purchased plans
containing the same coverage").
86. Risk in insurance pools is 1/N times the variance of each individual (N is the
number of members in the pool). The larger the pool and the more diverse the population,
the lower the variance in risk. CHARLES E. PHELPS, HEALTH ECONOMICS 331 (2003).
87. 1 ERIC MILLS HOLMES & MARK S. RHODES, HOLMES' APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE, 2D § 1.2
(1996) [hereinafter APPLEMAN]; ROBERT E. KEETON & ALAN I. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAW: A
GUIDE TO FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES, LEGAL DOCTRINES, AND COMMERCIAL PRACTICES 13
(Student ed. 1988).
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risks sufficiently large to minimize its insurance risk, reducing the value of
purchasing third-party insurance. s The consequence is that the EHBPs of
only very large employers should routinely self-insure, while most other
EHBPs should be willing to pay an insurance company a premium for the
service of bearing their insurance risk.
90
By allowing self-insured EHBPs to avoid state regulation, however,
ERISA provides EHBPs three additional incentives to self-insure. First, a
self-insured EHBP with members in multiple states can provide a single set
of benefits for all of its employees and avoid the cost of conforming to
conflicting regulations and mandates in different jurisdictions. Second,
that set of benefits can be more limited, and thus cheaper to provide, than
the set of benefits the EHBP would have to provide should it purchase
third-party insurance encumbered by state mandates. Third, by self-
insuring, EHBPs can avoid premium taxes on health insurance purchases
imposed by most states (usually for the purpose of subsidizing state
insurance pools to cover the uninsured or difficult-to-insure),
9' as well as
other state regulatory requirements that can be costly, inconvenient, or
both, such as regulations concerning what information insurers must be
provided to consumers. 92 While minimizing administrative burdens of
multi-state employers is a goal of ERISA, there is no indication that
ERISA's drafters affirmatively desired to protect EHBPs from all costs
associated with state insurance regulation. If that were Congress's goal, the
statute presumably would not have included the savings clause.
Measuring the absolute popularity of self-insurance among employers
at any given time is a notoriously inexact science, because understandings
89. See, e.g., Butler, supra note 11, at 62.
90. An exception to this rule might be some employers with very young workforces in
states that require certain types of insurers (often HMOs) to sell coverage at "community
rates"-that is rates that do not discriminate based on the demographics or claims
experience of particular employer groups. Cf David Reich-Hale, Big Employers Self-Funding
HMO Costs, NAT'L UNDERWRITER: LIFE & HEALTH / FIN. SERVICES EDITION, Oct. 11, 1999, at S-
21 (reporting that in 1998 sixty-three percent of employees in HMOs were in community-
based plans). These employers might find self-insurance a particularly desirable
arrangement because they can avoid paying insurance company rates that substantially
exceed their expected claims experience. See, e.g., Michael Prince, Self-Funded Health Plans
Not Expanding Ranks, Bus. INS., Feb. 21, 2000, at 3 ("Employers in community-rated HMOs
can generally save money by going into a self-funded HMO if their claims experience is
better than that of the overall group insured by the HMO.").
91. See, e.g., Prince, supra note 90, at 3.
92. See, e.g., Karl Polzer & Patricia A. Butler, Employee Health Plan Protections Under ERISA,
16 HEALTH AFF. 93, 94-95 (1997).
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of what constitutes self-insurance vary among employers and because
employers often offer employees a choice of plans,9" some of which might
be insured and others self-insured. Assessing the impact of ERISA's
favorable regulatory treatment of self-insured EHBPs on employers'
decisions about whether to self-insure is even more problematic because
many exogenous factors can affect the relative benefits of self-insuring• • 94
versus insuring. Notwithstanding these notes of qualification, however,
there is no doubt that self-insurance has become more popular among
employers, by many fold, over the last three decades, and that the desire to
avoid state benefits mandates and premium taxes can explain at least some
of this increase in popularity.
Employers shifted from insured to self-insured EHBPs in large
numbers in the 1980s. According to one study, only four percent of
employee health benefits were paid for by self-insured plans at the time of
ERISA's enactment, while forty-seven percent of EHBPs self-insured at least
their primary health benefits plan in 1986.95 According to other studies,
that number rose to sixty-seven percent in 1992,96 and forty-six percent of
all employees who received health coverage as an employment benefit
were enrolled in self-insured EHBPs by that year. 97
93. A recent Kaiser Family Foundation study reported that nearly half of all employees
covered by employment-based health plans had a choice of three or more different plans,
while only thirty-eight percent were offered only one plan. THE KAISER FAMILY FOUND. &
HEALTH RESEARCH & EDUc. TRUST, EMPLOYER HEALTH BENEFITS: 2003 ANNUAL SURVEY 64
(2003) [hereinafter KFF/HRET].
94. For example, high interest rates give employers an incentive to self-insure, because
self-insuring allows them to keep cash until an employee needs care rather than paying a
premium to the insurer at the beginning of the year. See, e.g., Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C.
Shaffer, Health Policy and ERISA: Interest Groups and Semipreemption, 14J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y &
L. 239, 252 (1989). Self-insurance also enables employers to collect detailed claims data in
order to try to manage employee benefit costs that insurance companies often will not
provide because they fear that employers with favorable claims experience might shop for
cheaper insurance or decide to self-insure. Michael Prince, Health Plans Shifting Approach as
Costs Climb, Bus. INS., Feb. 25, 2002, at 16.
95. Steve Kalmeyer, ERISA and State Health Reform, HEALTH POL'Y MONITOR, Spring 1997,
at 1.
96. A. FOSTER HIGGINS & Co., FOSTER HIGGINS HEALTH CARE BENEFITS SURVEY 19 (1992),
cited inJeffrey Lenhart, ERISA Preemption: The Effect of Stop-Loss Insurance on Self-Insured Health
Plans, 14 VA. TAx REv. 615, 615 n.1 (1995).
97. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, EMPLOYEE BENEFITS IN MEDIUM
AND LARGE PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS (1993); see also Gregory Acs et al., Self-Insured Employer
Health Plans: Prevalence, Profile, Provisions, and Premiums, 15 HEALTH AFF. 266-78 (1996)
(estimating that forty percent of private sector employees and their dependents were
V:I1 (2005)
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The strong correlation between the rise of managed care financing
arrangements and the corresponding explosion of state insurance
regulation on the one hand and the steep rise in employer self-insurance
on the other does not, of course, itself prove that the former caused the
latter. Many self-insured employers offer a rich set of benefits, suggesting
that many factors affect an employer's decision to self-insure, not just the
desire to save money by offering fewer benefits. Still, it seems clear that at
least some and probably much of the increase in self-insurance can be
attributed to the desire to use ERISA to avoid state regulations of one type
or another.9 As an illustration, one study attempting to explain the causes
of employer shifts to self-insurance in the 1980s found that the desire to
avoid the costs of state insurance mandates and premium taxes explained
about two-thirds of the increase in employer self-insurance observed in the
early part of that decade. 9
Although self-insurance rates have fluctuated in the last decade,'
00 at
least half of workers with employment-based health care benefits are
probably in self-insured plans today. One recent study conducted by the
Kaiser Family Foundation (KFF) reports that, in 2003, fifty-two percent of
workers with employment-based health care benefits were in self-insured
plans, down slightly from the fifty-six percent figure reported by a KPMG
study in 1996.01 By further increasing the differential susceptibility to state
regulation of insured and self-insured EHBPs, the Supreme Court's
expansion of ERISA's savings clause over the last three years suggests that
this percentage is likely to increase in coming years.
enrolled in self-insured plans).
98. Cf. Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme Court
Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 951, 1005 (2000) (claiming a causal
relationship between state regulation and the increasing number of self-insured EHBPs).
99. Jensen et al., supra note 45, at 208. In the authors' sample, state regulation could
not explain further increases in self-insurance later in the decade, which does suggest other
factors are also at play. The authors hypothesize that the different results for the different
time periods analyzed might be the result of greater state regulatory activity early in the
decade or employers most concerned with avoiding the costs of state regulation having
already converted to self-insurance early in the decade. Id. at 210-11.
100. Relatively small fluctuations in the rate of self-insurance can be due to factors
unrelated to the different regulatory treatment of insured and self-insured EHBPs, such as
the extent of price competition in the insurance market and changes in the popularity of
different types of managed care, some of which are easier to finance through self-insurance
than others. For a good discussion, see Jon R. Gabel et al., Self Insurance in Times of Growing
and Retreating Managed Care, 22 HEALTH AFF. 202 (2003).
101. KFF/HRET, supra note 93, at 125 exhibit 10.1.
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B. Stop-Loss Insurance
The regulatory benefits of self-insurance created by ERISA help to
explain why many EHBPs would like to self-insure, but the insurance risk
traditionally associated with self-insurance should remain a major
disincentive for all but the largest employers. What is most astonishing
about the extent to which employers self-insure is that, although very large
employers remain the most likely to self-insure their EHBPs, even small to
mid-sized employers self-insure in significant numbers. According to the
General Accounting Office, in 1992, thirty-two percent of employees
working for companies with more than 100 employees were covered by a
self-insured plan.12 KFF reports that in 2003 only ten percent of covered
employees in firms with fewer than 200 workers were in self-insured plans,
down from the twenty-four percent reported by KPMG in 1996, but KFF
also reports that fully fifty percent of covered employees in mid-sized firms
(200-999 employees) currently receive their benefits from self-insured
plans. 1
03
The surprising popularity of self-insurance among small and mid-sized
employers can be attributed significantly, although not entirely, to a
product known as "stop-loss" insurance (or, when issued to an EHBP,
sometimes known as "medical stop-loss" insurance).0 4 Although the details
can often be complicated, the basic concept of stop-loss insurance is
simple. The EHBP pays for its employees' covered medical care expenses
from a trust fund established for that purpose or from current revenues. 105
At the same time, the EHBP purchases third-party stop-loss insurance for
itself-not for its members-that covers losses suffered by the plan as the
result of members' catastrophic claims against it. The stop-loss insurance
102. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-95-167, EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH PLANS:
ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES POSED BY ERISA 49 (1995) [hereinafter GAO, ISSUES AND
TRENDS].
103. KFF/HRET, supra note 93, at 125 exhibit 10.1.
104. A large majority of self-insured EHBPs purchase stop-loss coverage, and nearly all
small and medium-sized employers that self-insure purchase stop-loss coverage to cap their
exposure. A. FOSTER HIGGINS & CO., supra note 96, at 19 (reporting sixty-four percent of self-
insured employers with more than one thousand employees purchased stop-loss coverage,
and ninety-six percent of self-insured employers with fewer than one thousand employees
purchased stop-loss coverage).
105. Paredes, supra note 6, at 249.
106. Id.; see also Deborah Shalowitz Cowans, Employers Have Various Options in Covering
Catastrophic Care, Bus. INS., Aug. 2, 1999, at 3 ("For the most part.... self-insured
employers.., rely on stop-loss insurance to fund and manage catastrophic health care
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pays the EHBP when the plan's losses in a given year exceed a
predetermined amount, known as the "attachment point."
Stop-loss policies can have either "specific" attachment points,
"aggregate" attachment points, or both. If the policy has a specific
attachment point, usually a dollar amount, the stop-loss insurance
reimburses the EHBP for any individual employee's medical costs in excess
of the attachment point. If the policy has an aggregate attachment point,
usually expressed as a percentage of the EHBP's actuarially determined
expected annual cost, the insurance is tapped if the EHBP pays out more
than that amount for total covered member medical 
care costs.10
Stop-loss coverage as a risk management tool for EHBPs is not a new
innovation. Just as traditional insurance providers usually "reinsure" part of
their insurance risk in order to minimize exposure to catastrophes, even
large EHBPs with an actuarially sound risk pool purchase stop-loss
insurance just in case an unexpected scourge has a disproportionately
catastrophic effect on its members.0 8 An innovation that made possible the
vast expansion of self-insured EHBPs in the 1980s and 1990s, especially
among smaller employers,00 was the sale of stop-loss policies with such low
attachment points-some as low as $500"-that the EHBP maintained
little insurance risk or none at all."' For example, in terms of the insurance
claims.").
107. Paredes, supra note 6, at 249.
108. One mid-1990s study found that sixty-one percent of all large employers self-fund
with stop-loss insurance, while only thirteen percent self-fund without stop-loss insurance.
Ken McDonnell, Questions and Answers on Health Insurance Benefit Issues, in EBRI ISSUE BRIEF
No. 164, at 12 (1995).
109. Cf Jerry Geisel, ERISA Showdown Likely over State Stop-Loss Bill, Bus. INS., May 3, 1999,
at 1 (reporting that small employers favor stop-loss policies with low attachment points,
whereas employers with more than 500 employees usually purchase policies with higher
attachment points).
110. See Key Patients' Protections: Lessons from the Field: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions of the United States, 106th Cong. 11 n.9 (1999)
(statement of Kathleen Sebelius, Kansas Insurance Commissioner) (observing that small
employers will often "self-fund only a very small dollar amount ($500) [of their employees'
health benefits] and then buy stop-loss insurance for the rest of their liability").
111. See, e.g., Md. Bars 'Stop-Loss' Policies, INS. ACcOUNTING, Nov. 1, 1999, at 1 (quoting
Maryland Insurance Commissioner describing the terms of one insurer's stop-loss policy).
Anecdotal evidence indicates that stop-loss policies with extremely low attachment points
became prevalent in the mid-1990s. See Polzer & Butler, supra note 92, at 98 (noting that
many state insurance regulators reported an "increasing number of small businesses are
ostensibly self-insuring while also purchasing stop-loss policies covering individual claims
exceeding $500 or $1,000").
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risk it maintains, there is no difference between an EHBP that purchases
third-party insurance policies for each employee with a $500 annual
deductible and an EHBP that offers a self-insured benefit plan with a $500
deductible and maintains stop-loss insurance with a $500 specific
attachment point per employee-in both examples, the employer retains
no insurance risk at all. By hiring a TPA and purchasing stop-loss coverage
with low attachment points (sometimes from the same company), self-
insured EHBPs can virtually eliminate all of the costs of self-insurance
while taking advantage of the beneficial regulatory treatment provided to
them by virtue of ERISA.
In light of the Supreme Court's recent expansive interpretations of
ERISA's savings clause, the incentives for EHBPs to self-insure and
purchase stop-loss insurance rather than purchase third-party health
insurance are now more compelling than ever, although unrelated market
forces that have caused sharp increases in stop-loss insurance premiums in
the last few years could temporarily dampen this incentive. 
1 12
C. Legal Challenges
The late 1980s and early 1990s brought a number of legal challenges
to the use of self-insurance arrangements coupled with stop-loss insurance
by EHBPs attempting to avoid state insurance regulations. All of these
challenges failed, as they should have, although the courts' reasoning was
not always as precise as it might have been.
In the typical challenge, a self-insured EHBP that carries stop-loss
insurance attempts to enforce a provision of the plan that is contrary to
state law, or a plaintiff attempts to enforce a provision of state law that is
contrary to the terms of a plan against an EHBP that carries stop-loss
insurance. For example, in United Food & Commercial Workers v. Pacyga,1 1 3 a
state anti-subrogation law prevented insurance companies from recovering
benefit payments made to insured members who collected duplicate
112. See, e.g., Karen Cutts, Using RRGs To Fund Stop-Loss Exposures in Self-Funded Medical
Plans, NAT'L UNDERWRITER: PROP. & CASUALTY / RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION, Apr. 7,
2003, at 33 (reporting current increases in medical stop-loss insurance premiums of twenty
to fifty percent); Michael Prince, Employers To Feel Bite of Health Reinsurance Rate Hikes, Bus.
INS., Oct. 23, 2000, at 30 (describing a number of trends, in addition to health care
inflation, driving up stop-loss insurance rates); Michael Prince, Reinsurers Shifting More
Health Risks to Buyers, Bus. INS., Oct. 28. 2002, at 10 (reporting that the price of medical
stop-loss policies increased twenty to thirty percent in 2002 as a consequence of insurers
suffering losses in other product lines and the reduction of overall capacity in the market).
113. 801 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1986).
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benefits from another party, such as a tortfeasor." 4 When an EHBP sought
subrogation according to the plan's coverage terms, the member, relying
on the Supreme Court's distinction between self-insured and insured plans
drawn in Metropolitan Life and FMC Corp., argued that the plan's
subrogation clause was unenforceable because the plan's stop-loss coverage
rendered it "insured" and thus not shielded from state regulation by the
deemer clause.
The Ninth Circuit in United Food, like the Fourth 1 1 5 and Sixth'1 6 Circuits
in similar cases, ruled that the deemer clause did in fact protect the EHBP
from the state regulation in question, notwithstanding the fact that the
EHBP purchased stop-loss insurance." 7 The usual justification is that the
purchase of stop-loss insurance fails to render an EHBP "insured" for
ERISA purposes because the EHBP maintains direct liability to plan
members, while the stop-loss insurer is liable only to the plan, not to
individual members." 8 Therefore, as some courts have explained, an EHBP
with stop-loss insurance would be liable to plan members for the cost of
their health care even if the stop-loss insurer were to become insolvent,
and conversely, members would have no claim against a stop-loss insurer if
the employer went bankrupt, while an EHBP that purchases third-party
health insurance for its members would have no liability to those members
114. Id. at 1159.
115. Talquin v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 649 (4th Cir. 1991).
116. Lincoln Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lectron Prods., Inc., 970 F.2d 206 (6th Cir. 1992). Lincoln
Mutual explicitly overruled an earlier, contrary decision in Northern Group Services, Inc. v.
Auto Owners Ins. Co., 833 F.2d 85 (6th Cir. 1987). Lincoln Mutual, 970 F.2d at 210 n.3. An
earlier Sixth Circuit decision in Michigan United Food & Commercial Workers Unions v.
Baerwaldt, 767 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1984), held that an EHBP that purchased stop-loss
coverage must abide by a state insurance regulation, id. at 313, and is thus sometimes cited
as conflicting authority, see, e.g., Paredes, supra note 6, at 256-57. The Baerwaldt decision,
however, was based on the court's understanding from the plaintiffs complaint that the
insurance company "will pay all benefits in excess of claims liability limit under the group
policies"-that is, that the stop-loss insurance insured the plan members health care costs
directly rather than insuring the plan itself. 767 F.2d at 313. Thus, while the court might
have misunderstood the nature of the EHBP's arrangement with the insurance company,
based on its understanding that benefits were provided to plan members by an insurance
company rather than by the EHBP itself, its holding is not inconsistent with Lincoln Mutual,
United Food, or Talquin.
117. 801 F.2d at 1161-62.
118. See Talquin, 928 F.2d at 653 (noting that Talquin's plan is directly liable to Talquin's
employees and the stop-loss insurance covers the plan); United Food, 801 F.2d at 1161-62
(noting that "no insurance is provided to the participants").
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if the insurance company became insolvent."9
Whether or not this distinction is functionally significant, however, it is
irrelevant under ERISA. The relevant distinction between insured and self-
insured EHBPs for ERISA's purposes is that members of an insured plan
have a contract with an insurance company, whereas members of a self-
insured plan have a contract only with the plan. ERISA distinguishes
between insurance companies, which states may regulate, and EHBPs
themselves, which states may not regulate, but the statutory text never
makes a distinction between insured and self-insured plans per se. The
plain language of ERISA requires courts to ask only whether the terms of a
plan member's health insurance contract are provided by an EHBP or by a
third-party insurance company-the deemer clause, recall, states only that
an employee benefit plan may not be regulated like an insurance
company.2 0 If an insurance company covers the member, state law may
override terms of the insurance contract and substitute different or
additional terms. If the EHBP itself covers the member, state law governing
insurance companies may not override the terms of the insurance contract
because states may not regulate EHBPs as insurance companies. So, for
example, if an insurance company issues a policy to an EHBP member that
excludes coverage for mental health care, a state mental health care
mandate can nullify that exclusion and effectively rewrite the contract
between the individual and the insurance company. On the other hand, if
an EHBP enters into an equivalent contract with a plan member, the
deemer clause prohibits the same state mandate from overriding the
exclusion, even though the EHBP behaves functionally like an insurance
company vis-a-vis its members.
In Metropolitan Life, the Supreme Court observed that a consequence
of ERISA, in the context of the issues raised in that case, is that insured
and self-insured plans receive different treatment. This observation is
correct. Unfortunately, lower courts have sometimes misinterpreted this
observation as being equivalent to a statement that the distinction between
insured and self-insured plans is itself doctrinally relevant, which it is not-
these terms of art never appear in ERISA's text. This error has led to a
serious analytical tangle, as courts struggle to determine whether EHBPs
that directly insure their members' health care costs and purchase stop-loss
insurance for themselves are functionally "insured" or "self-insured." Such
119. See Am. Med. Sec., Inc. v. Bartlett, 111 F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 1997); Georgetown
Univ. Hosp. v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., No. 97-1912, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 7803, at
*5-*6 (4th Cir. 1999).
120. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (2) (B) (2000).
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EHBPs appear to be self-insured, in the sense that they bear the insurance
risk of their members' illnesses and injuries rather than paying a third-
party to bear that risk. On the other hand, they appear to be insured from
a functional perspective, in the sense that they purchase insurance
coverage to protect themselves from losses.
Some courts have responded to the confusion over the terms "insured"
and "self-insured" by attempting to determine whether an EHBP is
predominantly insured or self-insured. For example, in Brown v.
Granatelli,121 the Fifth Circuit found that an EHBP with high-attachment
point stop-loss coverage was self-insured and protected from state law by
ERISA's deemer clause. 122 It suggested in dicta, however, that an EHBP
with low-attachment point stop-loss insurance likely would be considered
an "insured" plan subject to state regulation. 12 3 Other courts have followed
the Fifth Circuit in suggesting that whether an EHBP is subject to state
regulation might depend on the specific level of its stop-loss insurance's
attachment point.
24
This type of analysis is fundamentally misguided, because whether an
EHBP maintains the actual insurance risk associated with employee illness
bears no direct relevance to the question of whether the deemer clause,
according to its text, prohibits state regulation of its members' health
insurance contracts. Courts need only ask which entity promises to pay the
health care costs incurred by plan members. If the EHBP must pay these
costs, and thus acts as an insurer of its employee's health care, the state
may not regulate the provisions of the employee-EHBP contract, and the
plan is therefore "self-insured" according to the Metropolitan Life
dichotomy. If a third-party insurance company bears the insurance risk of
the employee's health care, the state may regulate the insurance contract,
and the plan is therefore "insured" under Metropolitan Life. Whether a self-
insured plan does or does not purchase stop-loss insurance, or whether
that stop-loss insurance has a low or high attachment point, is simply
irrelevant, at least under a close reading of ERISA's text.
121. 897 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1990).
122. Id. at 1355.
123. Id.
124. See Bricklayers Local No. 1 Welfare Fund v. La. Health Ins. Ass'n, 771 F. Supp 771,
774 (E.D. La. 1991); Thompson v. Talquin Bldg. Prods. Co., C.A. No. 89-0082-H, 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11380 (W.D. Va. 1990); Associated Indus. of Missouri v. Angoff, 937 S.W.2d
277, 283 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996).
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D. Should Courts Close the Loophole?
Many observers have criticized the differential treatment that self-
insured and insured EHBPs receive vis-A-vis state law. 125 Following the
Supreme Court's lead in Metropolitan Lifr,'2 r however, most attribute
responsibility for the distinction to Congress, which drafted ERISA, rather
than to the courts, whose job is only to interpret the statute. 27 Wise or not
as a matter of policy, it would be impossible for courts to eliminate this
distinction entirely without reading the deemer clause out of the statute-
a result that would be inconsistent with any mainstream view of proper
statutory interpretation.
Employer attempts to evade both state regulation and insurance risk
by purchasing stop-loss insurance with low attachment points has elicited a
somewhat different reaction; some courts and commentators suggest that
courts should deny deemer clause protection to such plans.12 8 Although
such a judicial approach would require courts to ignore ERISA's text, it
arguably would be consistent with a "purposive" view of statutory
interpretation 2 9 if EHBP use of stop-loss insurance undermines the
legislative goals implicit in ERISA.
The problem with this approach is that the extensive use of stop-loss
insurance by EHBPs does not undermine ERISA. This is not to say that
EHBPs that purchase low-attachment point stop-loss coverage are not
exploiting a loophole in ERISA's text-they clearly are. It is unlikely that
125. See, e.g., Pitsenberger, supra note 5; Strain & Kinney, supra note 5.
126. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985) (stating
that by recognizing differential treatment received by members of insured and self-insured
plans, the Court only recognizes a "distinction created by Congress").
127. See, e.g., Edward Alburo Morrissey, Deem and Deemer: ERISA Preemption Under the
Deemer Clause as Applied to Employer Health Care Plans with Stop-Loss Insurance, 23 J. LEGIS. 307,
314 (1997); cf Robert N. Covington, Amending ERISA's Preemption Scheme, KAN.J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y, Winter 1999, at 1 (suggesting the need to amend the statute); Mark Alan Edwards,
Comment, Protections for ERISA Self-Insured Employee Welfare Benefit Plan Participants: New
Possibilities for State Action in the Event of Plan Failure, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 351, 368-69
(suggesting that "[tihe most logical way to reform the preemption effects of a federal
statute... is to amend the staute itself").
128. Brown v. Granatelli, 897 F.2d 1351, 1355 (5th Cir. 1990); Sebelius, supra note 110, at
11 n.9 (arguing that self-insured employers with low attachment point stop-loss insurance
should not be considered "self-insured" and should be required to follow state mandates).
129. HENRY C. BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF THE
LAWS § 33 (1911); RONALD B. BROWN & SHARONJ. BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE
SEARCH FOR LEGISLATIVE INTENT § 4.5 (2002).
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the members of Congress who enacted ERISA in 1974 anticipated that
EHBPs would be able to avoid the indirect effects of state insurance
regulation while avoiding most insurance risk and would do so in large
numbers. But the Congressional purpose inherent in ERISA's savings and
deemer clauses is not to prevent small employers from avoiding state
mandates. Rather, the purpose of ERISA's complicated structure is to
balance traditional state authority to regulate insurance with employers'
interest in avoiding the burden of complying with conflicting state 
laws. 30
In striking that balance, ERISA creates two categories of EHBPs-those
that purchase third-party insurance for their employees and those that do
not-and allows the EHBPs themselves to choose their category. By
creatively identifying ways of making it less costly to choose one category
rather than the other, EHBPs act consistently rather than inconsistently
with ERISA structure.
III. EXPLOITING THE SAVINGS CLAUSE LOOPHOLE
As Part II explained, ERISA's text in no way suggests that whether an
EHBP purchases stop-loss insurance has any relevance to the question of
whether the terms of health care coverage it provides its members are
subject to state regulation, regardless of whether the attachment point of
the stop-loss coverage is high or low. Additionally, there is no justification
for courts to ignore ERISA's text in an effort to vindicate its purpose,
because employers' use of stop-loss insurance does not undermine ERISA's
attempt to balance competing policy goals. These conclusions do not
suggest, however, that proponents of greater state regulation of health
insurance must concede that they have been outmaneuvered by crafty
employers. Just as the deemer clause creates a loophole that employers can
exploit in an effort to minimize the reach of state regulation, the savings
clause creates a loophole that states may exploit in an effort to maximize
their regulatory reach.
ERISA permits EHBPs to arrange their business affairs in such a way
that maximizes the benefits of self-insuring relative to purchasing third-
party insurance. But ERISA also permits states to use their authority under
the savings clause to maximize the benefits to EHBPs of purchasing third-
party insurance relative to self-insuring. If states are unhappy that EHBPs
use stop-loss insurance to make self-insuring a relatively more attractive
option than purchasing state-regulated third-party insurance, their best
130. See, e.g., Ingersoll-Rand, 498 U.S. at 142 (describing ERISA's intent to minimize
burdens on employers of conflicting state regulations).
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response is to regulate stop-loss insurers in a way that undermines that
advantage.
To date, some states have attempted to exploit this loophole, but their
success has been limited in two ways. First, the Second Circuit's decision in
Travelers Insurance Co. v. Cuomo13 1 and the Fourth Circuit's decision in
American Medical Security v. Bartlett32 invalidated two states' attempts to
exploit this loophole, casting doubt on its legality. Both cases were
incorrectly decided when issued, however, and the Supreme Court's recent
opinion in Kentucky Ass'n further undermines them. Therefore, those
decisions should not deter states-certainly those outside of the Second
and Fourth Circuits-from taking advantage of the loophole. Second,
since no state has yet exploited the loophole as fully as is possible, its full
effect has never been tested. This Part describes the savings clause
loophole, analyzes its legal status, explains how states can expand it, and
considers the policy consequences of doing so.
A. Exploiting the Loophole with Minimum Attachment Points
In 1995, the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC)
enacted a model statute requiring that stop-loss insurance policies sold to
EHBPs to protect against excessive health care expenses include minimum
attachment point levels. 33 The NAIC model calls for specific attachment
points to be a minimum of $20,000, and minimum aggregate attachment
points to be 110 to 120 percent of the EHBP's expected annual claims,
depending on the size of the EHBP covered.'34 Currently, at least fifteen
states have adopted statutes or promulgated administrative regulations
along the lines of the NAIC model. 3 5 The purpose of such state regulations
131. 14 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd in part by N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross &
Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995).
132. 111 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1997).
133. STOP Loss INs. ACT (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs 2004).
134. Id.
135. State statutes follow the structure of the NAIC model, although they sometimes
change the aggregate and specific attachment points. See AiASKA STAT. § 21.42.145 (2004)
(requiring stop-loss policies in Alaska to have at minimum a specific attachment point of
$10,000 and an aggregate attachment point for small employers of the greatest of $4000
times the number of individuals, 120% of expected claims, or $20,000); GA. CODE. ANN. §
33-50-5 (2002) (giving the Georgia Insurance Commissioner ability to review stop-loss
policies); COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-16-119 (2002) (requiring a $15,000 minimum specific
attachment point and 120% minimum aggregate attachment point for policies issued in or
after 2003); MINN. STAT. § 60A.235 (2002) (requiring stop-loss policies in Minnesota to have
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is no secret. As the Maryland Insurance Commissioner explained when
initially promulgating that state's regulation, the goal of such rules is to
prevent EHBPs from substituting stop-loss coverage for third-party health
insurance in order to avoid the costs of state mandated benefits and other
regulations while continuing to shift the insurance risk of employee illness
to third parties.1
36
The deemer clause clearly prevents states from regulating EHBPs, but
the savings clause just as clearly allows states to regulate insurance as long
as the regulations do not extend to EHBPs. Stop-loss coverage providers,
like health insurers, are in the business of insurance. If states may regulate
the terms and conditions of health insurance policies, as Metropolitan Life
clearly established that they can, states may also regulate the terms and
conditions of stop-loss policies. When states require health insurance
policies to include specific benefits, the option of purchasing third-party
health insurance becomes less attractive to some EHBPs relative to the
option of self-insuring. When states require stop-loss policies to include
minimum attachment points, the option of purchasing third-party health
insurance becomes more attractive to some EHBPs relative to the option of
self-insuring. The fact that the savings clause gives states a tool to
encourage EHBPs to purchase third-party insurance is no doubt an
a minimum specific attachment point of $10,000 and a minimum aggregate attachment
point higher than the sum of 140% of the first $50,000 of expected claims, 120% of the
next $450,000 of expected claims, and 110% of the remaining expected claims); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 17B:27A-17 (West 2003) (requiring stop-loss policies in New Jersey to have a
minimum specific attachment point of $25,000 and a minimum aggregate attachment point
of 125% of expected claims); OR. REV. STAT. § 742.065 (2001) (requiring stop-loss policies
in Oregon to have a minimum specific attachment point of $10,000 and a minimum
aggregate attachment point of 120% of expected claims); 191 IOWA ADMIN. CODE §
35.20(2) (g) (requiring stop-loss policies in Iowa to have minimum aggregate coverage at
125% of actuarially projected claims); NEv. ADMIN. CODE ch. 689B § 350 (2003) (requiring
stop-loss policies in Nevada to have a minimum specific attachment point of $10,000; a
minimum aggregate attachment point for groups not more than fifty people that is lower
than the greater of $4000 times the number of group members, 120% of expected claims,
or $10,000; for groups of more than fifty people an aggregate attachment point not lower
than 110% of expected claims); 31 PA. CODE § 89.472 (2003) (requiring stop-loss policies in
Pennsylvania to have a minimum specific attachment point of $10,000 and a minimum
aggregate attachment point of $100,000).
136. See Am. Med. Sec., 111 F.3d at 362; see also Van Enters. v. Avemco Ins. Co., 231 F.
Supp. 2d 1071, 1084 (D. Kan. 2002) (citing a bulletin issued by the Kansas Insurance
Commissioner describing a desire to regulate stop-loss insurance because some "self-funded
arrangements [we]re being formed for the purpose of avoiding compliance with Kansas'
recent health insurance reform legislation").
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unintended consequence of ERISA's structure. But then, so is the fact that
the deemer clause allows EHBPs to use self-insurance coupled with low-
attachment point stop-loss coverage to avoid the costs of state mandates
without retaining any real insurance risk.
B. The Loophole Closed? Two Circuits Invalidate Stop-Loss Regulations
1. Travelers Insurance Co. v. Cuomo
In 1993, the Second Circuit considered challenges to a New York
statute imposing hospital rate surcharges that differed based on the
identity of the payer of hospital charges and to a New York Insurance
Department regulation of stop-loss insurance contracts.17 The court held
that ERISA preempted both the surcharges and the stop-loss regulations.
3 8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question of whether the
surcharges were preempted 39 and then, in a landmark decision that
narrowed the scope of ERISA's "relates to" clause, reversed.'40 The Court
left unreviewed, however, the portion of the Second Circuit's opinion
concerning stop-loss insurance regulation.
The stop-loss regulation at issue required stop-loss insurers to
"undertake to ensure that statutorily mandated benefits be covered" by the
underlying EHBP.14 The Travelers court held that the regulation related to
employee benefit plans and was not protected by the savings clause
because it did not qualify as an insurance regulation. The court's analysis,
in relevant part, consisted of the following points: (1) the provision was
"not limited just to the stop-loss layer of insurance but appl[ied] generally
to the entire" EHBP; and (2) the regulation did "not have the effect of
transferring or spreading risk between a self-funded plan and its stop-loss
insurer.' 42 Although both descriptions are fair characterizations of the
New York regulation's effects, neither supports the conclusion that the
provision does not constitute an "insurance regulation" protected by the
savings clause. Any law governing to whom and under what conditions an
137. Travelers, 14 F.3d at 711.
138. Id.
139. N.Y. State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514
U.S. 645, 654 (1995).
140. Id. For a detailed analysis of the Supreme Court's decision and its effect the
jurisprudence of ERISA's "relates to" clause, see Korobkin, supra note 27, at 488-90.
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insurance company may sell insurance products to customers constitutes a
"regulation of insurance" under any common-sense understanding of that
term.
The Supreme Court's decision last term in Kentucky Ass'n jettisoned
the Court's prior complicated test for whether a state law constitutes an
insurance regulation for savings clause purposes, replacing it with a
simpler approach consistent with this view. In so doing, it severely
undermined the Second Circuit's holding in Travelers. Recall that under
the rule of Kentucky Ass'n, a state law qualifies for protection from ERISA
preemption under the savings clause so long as the law is "specifically
directed" at the insurance industry and it regulates insurance practices.
43
The New York regulation clearly satisfied both prongs of this test, as the
following paragraphs explain.
In Kentucky Ass'n, petitioner health insurance companies argued that a
state "any willing provider" (AWP) law preventing insurers from excluding
health care providers from their networks was not specifically directed at
insurers because it equally affected providers. 44 Disposing of this
argument, the Court first observed that, by its terms, the statute imposed
requirements only on insurers. 145 It then explained that the fact that a
regulation of insurance entities has the consequence of affecting the
choices available to other entities does not preclude savings clause
protection for the regulation. 46 Like the Kentucky AWP law, the New York
regulation at issue in Travelers was specifically directed only at insurance
companies (specifically, those that sell stop-loss insurance policies). By
essentially forbidding insurance companies from selling policies to EHBPs
that do not provide the full range of benefits that the state mandates of
health insurers, the regulation certainly affected the range of contracting
options available to New York EHBPs, but not in a qualitatively different
way than the Kentucky Ass'n AWP law impacted the range of contracting
options available to Kentucky doctors. More to the point, all insurance
regulations affect the market choices available to third parties who wish to
contract with insurance companies;147 the New York stop-loss regulation was
143. Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 1475 (2003); see also supra
Subsection I.B.3.
144. Kentucky Ass'n, 123 S. Ct. at 1475.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1475-76.
147. Id. at 1476 ("Regulations 'directed toward' certain entities will almost always disable
other entities from doing, with the regulated entities, what the regulations forbid; this does
not suffice to place such regulation outside the scope of ERISA's savings clause.").
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a quite ordinary insurance regulation in this respect.
The Kentucky Ass'n petitioners also argued that the AWP laws at issue
did not regulate the insurance practices of insurance companies because
those laws did not directly affect the allocation of risk between insurers and
insured members. 148 Rejecting this argument, the Court explained that the
laws affected insurance practices by limiting the "scope of permissible
bargains" between insurers and potential customers, as contrasted with a
regulation governing how much insurance companies must pay janitors to
clean their offices, which would be directed at insurance companies but
have nothing to do with the insurance function. 149 Similarly, the New York
stop-loss regulation is directed at insurance companies qua insurance
companies, rather than insurance companies qua purchasers of office
supplies, insurance companies qua landlords, or insurance companies
acting in some other role unrelated to the provision of insurance.
2. American Medical Security, Inc. v. Bartlett
In 1995, the Maryland Insurance Commissioner promulgated a
regulation providing that an insurance product sold to an employer that
insures against the cost of claims that result from employees' sickness or
accidents would be characterized as "stop-loss insurance" only if it has a
minimum specific attachment point of $20,000 and a minimum aggregate
attachment point of at least 125% of the expected annual claims cost. 150 A
group of employers with self-funded EHBPs sought an injunction against
Maryland's enforcement of the regulation,15 ' and the regulation became
the test case for whether states possessed the power to exploit ERISA's
savings clause loophole.
In American Medical Security, Inc. v. Bartlett,'52 the Fourth Circuit upheld
a district court ruling that ERISA preempted the regulation on the ground
that it "attempt[ed] to mandate benefits that certain self-insured plans may
offer." 5 American Medical Security remains today the leading federal court
148. Id. at 1477.
149. Id.
150. MD. REGS. CODE tit. 9 § 31.02 (1995), repealed by Am. Med. Sec., Inc., v. Barlett. 111
F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 1997). In a subsequent revision of the regulation, Insurance
Commissioner changed the minimum specific attachment point for stop-loss insurance to
$10,000 and the minimum aggregate attachment point to 115% of expected claims costs. 23
Md. Reg. Issue 2,Jan. 19, 1996.
151. Am. Med. Sec., 111 F.3d at 360-61.
152. 111 F.3d 358.
153. Id. at 365.
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decision on the subject of state attempts to regulate stop-loss insurance for
the purpose of making self-insuring a less attractive option for EHBPs.
5 4
This is unfortunate because the opinion is badly flawed. At the time it was
issued it was inconsistent with ERISA's text and structure as well as existing
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the statute. In addition, the
Supreme Court's Kentucky Ass'n decision now provides further support for
the contention that American Medical Security was wrongly decided.
Maryland's attempt to exploit the savings clause made for a bad test
case from the start because that state's regulation was at best poorly drafted
and at worst substantively incoherent. Rather than establishing minimum
attachment points for stop-loss insurance, effectively prohibiting the sale of
stop-loss insurance with lower attachment points, as the NAIC model
statute does, the Maryland regulation provided that an insurance policy
with a low attachment point that protected an EHBP against losses
resulting from employee health care costs would be "considered to be a
policy or contract of health insurance."55
The most natural reading of this regulation is that low-attachment-
point stop-loss policies would be required to provide coverage for state-
mandated health care benefits. 6 The problem with such a requirement is
that it is logically incoherent to require a stop-loss insurer to cover
mandated health benefits because a stop-loss insurer's customers-
EHBPs-need not provide state-mandated benefits to plan members in the
154. Although American Medical Security postdates the Second Circuit's decision in
Travelers, the Travelers decision has been largely overlooked by commentators, most likely
because the majority of that opinion-but not the portion relevant to this discussion-was
subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court. Only Travelers and American Medical Security
have addressed state attempts to exploit the savings clause loophole on the merits. The
issue has been raised in a handful of other cases, but these other courts have resolved their
cases on procedural grounds without opining on the substantive question. See, e.g.,
Associated Indus. of Mo. v. Angoff, 937 S.W.2d 277, 284-85 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996) (overruling
Mo. CODE REGS. ANN. fit. 20 § 400-2.150, a regulation of stop-loss insurance, because the
insurance commissioner needed statutory authority or actuarial data to set the minimum
attachment point for stop-loss insurance); Van Enter., Inc. v. Avemco Ins. Co., 231 F. Supp.
2d 1071, 1087-88 (D. Kan. 2002) (overruling a decision by the insurance commissioner to
place minimum aggregate and specific attachment points on stop-loss insurance because he
did not have statutory authority to do so).
155. MD. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 9 § 31.02.
156. Cf Brown v. Granatelli, 897 F.2d 1351, 1356-58 (5th Cir. 1990) (Brown, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that a stop-loss policy covering an EHBP is in fact a group health
insurance policy under Texas law and therefore required to provide state health benefits
mandates).
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first instance. Consider, for example, a Maryland mandate that health
insurers provide coverage for skilled nursing home facilities. 17 What would
it mean for Maryland to require an insurance policy issued to an EHBP to
include such coverage? Arguably, this requirement could be interpreted as
preventing the stop-loss insurer from excluding the EHBP's costs of
providing skilled nursing care to its members from its calculation of
whether an EHBP's losses have reached the policy's attachment point.
Such an interpretation would be unobjectionable but mostly beside the
point, because the insurance commissioner's concern in enacting the
regulation was with EHBPs that do not provide skilled nursing home
benefits, not with stop-loss carriers that refuse to reimburse EHBPs for the
costs of nursing home care. If an EHBP excludes skilled nursing home care
from the benefits it promises to its members, a stop-loss insurance
company will never find itself obligated to pay costs incurred as a result of
plan members receiving skilled nursing home care. Because the EHBP
does not pay nursing home costs, the fact that a plan member incurs such
costs will never result in the EHBP making a claim against its stop-loss
insurance policy. A variation of this understanding of the regulation is that
it requires a stop-loss insurer to reimburse employees directly for skilled
nursing home costs that the employees incur. This interpretation makes
little sense either, because stop-loss insurers have no contractual
obligations of any kind to employees.
A less natural, but still plausible, interpretation of the Maryland
regulation is that by labeling certain stop-loss insurance policies "health
insurance," the state would consider the EHBP purchasers of those policies
to be "insured" rather than "self-insured" plans for ERISA purposes and
therefore required to provide all state-mandated benefits to their
members.
The problems with the Fourth Circuit's decision in American Medical
Security begin with its failure to make clear which of these readings (i.e.,
stop-loss insurers must pay for mandated benefits or EHBPs that purchase
stop-loss insurance must provide mandated benefits) it gave to the
regulation under scrutiny. At one point the court "recognize [s] that the
regulations are carefully drafted to focus directly on insurance companies
issuing stop-loss insurance and not on the [EHBPs] themselves.' 5" This
statement implies the former construction. In the very next paragraph,
however, the court asserts that the regulation "seek[s] to require self-
157. MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-801 (2003).
158. Am. Med. Sec., 111 F.3d at 363.
V:I1 (2005)
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funded plans to offer coverage consistent with state insurance law. '' 159 This
statement implies the latter interpretation.
Which of these two statements reflects the court's interpretation of the
regulation is critical. If the Maryland regulation is interpreted to mandate
that self-funded EHBPs with low-attachment-point stop-loss coverage
provide specific benefits to their members, then the rule clearly would be
preempted, but the court's opinion would be of trivial importance because
it merely follows well-established deemer-clause precedent-states may not
regulate EHBPs as if they are insurance companies, even if they serve an
insurance function.1 60 If the Maryland regulation places requirements only
on stop-loss insurance companies, as it appears to according to its text,
however, the resolution of the case takes on a great deal of importance.
This court's confusion is understandable in light of the regulation's
incoherence, but it makes it quite difficult to divine the court's holding in
the case.
The court's failure to clearly state its interpretation of what the
regulation at issue actually requires suggests a lack of understanding on its
part that its precise resolution of this question is important to the case. The
best explanation of why American Medical Security explains the court's
understanding of the Maryland regulation so poorly is that the court
determined that ERISA preempts the regulation regardless of its precise
meaning. The court's opinion repeatedly emphasizes that the Maryland
regulation had the "purpose and effect" of influencing the behavior of self-
funded plans.'61 It asserts that the deemer clause prohibits Maryland law
from "aiming at the plan-participant relationship. 1 62 It also concludes that
such purpose and effect calls into doubt whether the savings clause
protects Maryland regulation because it arguably fails the Supreme Court's
savings clause requirements of being a state law directed at the insurance
industry and being integral to the insured-insurer relationship. 63 Thus, the
court appears to believe that ERISA's deemer clause, and perhaps also its
savings clause, prohibit state regulations enacted with the intent or effect
of increasing the attractiveness to EHBP's of purchasing third party health
insurance for their members, regardless of whether the state directly regulates
159. Id. at 363-64.
160. See supra Section II.C.
161. Am. Med. Sec., 111 F.3d at 363.
162. Id. at 364.
163. Id. at 363 ("[T]he complications of the second and third Metropolitan Life factors
[concerning the savings clause] together with the 'deemer clause' provide the core
difficulty with the state's regulation of stop-loss insurance policies issued to ERISA plans.").
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what choices EHBPs must make or, alternatively, regulates the products third-party
insurance companies may sell.
There is no text or precedent that supports this interpretation of
ERISA. States' power to regulate under the savings clause is limited only by
the deemer clause's prohibition against applying insurance regulations to
EHBPs themselves. American Medical Security's conclusion that it is
"impermissibl[e]" for state regulations to affect ERISA plans' "costs and
choices" finds no support in ERISA's language and is inconsistent with the
statute's structure,'6 which allows for the preemption of a state law that
"relates to" EHBPs and then the saving of that same law as an insurance
regulation. The court's sweeping statement effectively reads the savings
clause out of the statute. The court's conclusion also is inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's ruling in Metropolitan Life. State benefits mandates
increase the costs associated with purchasing health insurance for EHBPs
and limit the choices available in the insurance market. Stop-loss insurance
regulations merely have similar effects on an EHBP's decision to self-
insure.
The Fourth Circuit's analysis begins to go awry when it asserts that
"state insurance regulation may not directly or indirectly regulate self-
funded ERISA plans" ' 5-a statement of the law that is, at best, misleading.
As explained above, whether an EHBP is insured or self-insured is not the
operative question under ERISA. The statute prohibits states from directly
regulating EHBPs, whether they purchase third-party insurance or not. But
a state regulation of insurance may indirectly affect options available to
EHBPs, and it may therefore make self-insurance more or less attractive to
EHBPs. If a state law having such an effect is considered an "indirect
regulation," then the Fourth Circuit's statement of the law is incorrect.
As authority for its "directly or indirectly" statement, American Medical
Security cites to the Supreme Court's decision in FMC Corp.,66 but the
relevant passage in FMC Corp. is actually itself a quotation from the
Supreme Court's earlier opinion in Metropolitan Life. In the original
statement, the Court said: "We are aware that our decision [upholding a
mental health mandate as applied to third-party insurance companies]
results in a distinction between insured and [self-insured] plans, leaving
the former open to indirect regulation while the latter are not."1 67 This
164. Id. at 364.
165. Id. at 361.
166. Id. (citing FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 62 (1990)).
167. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985), quoted in FMC
Corp., 498 U.S. at 62.
V:I1 (2005)
38
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 5 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol5/iss1/2
THE BATTLE OVER SELF-INSURED HEALTH PLANS
sentence recognizes that an EHBP that purchases third-party health
insurance for its employees is indirectly subject to benefits mandates
(because it cannot buy insurance that does not include the specified
benefits), whereas an EHBP that self-insures its employees' health care
costs is not affected at all-indirectly or otherwise-by the state law. The
mere observation that state benefits mandates do not have even an indirect
effect on self-insured EHBPs does not logically imply that other types of
state insurance regulations that do have an indirect effect on self-insured
EHBPs are therefore prohibited, as it would have to for Metropolitan Life to
support the Fourth Circuit's conclusion in American Medical Security. In fact,
Metropolitan Life suggests exactly the opposite: A state's direct regulation of
insurance may permissibly have the effect of skewing the cost benefit
analysis of an EHBP deciding whether to self-insure its members' health
care costs or purchase third-party health insurance policies for that
purpose.
Although the American Medical Security court's decision finds no
support in ERISA's language or in the relevant Supreme Court decisions
on related issues, the court's decision could be defensible nonetheless if
the specific type of state law in question undermines ERISA's intent.68 The
problem is that the argument that states should be prohibited from
regulating stop-loss insurance in a way that makes self-insurance less
attractive to EHBPs runs into precisely the same trouble as does the
argument that EHBPs should be prohibited from using stop-loss insurance
with low attachment points to make self-insurance more appealing.
69
ERISA balances the value of allowing states to regulate insurance with the
value of allowing employers to avoid inconsistent state laws. To effectuate
this balance, Congress gave states the right to regulate insurance
companies under the savings clause and gave EHBPs a safe harbor under
the deemer clause to avoid such regulation by not purchasing third-party
insurance. Congress did not intend for ERISA to make it particularly easy
or cost-free for EHBPs to opt to finance their member benefits without
third-party insurance any more than it intended to make self-insuring
particularly burdensome. State attempts to use stop-loss insurance
regulation to make self-insurance less attractive to EHBPs exploit a
loophole, but such exploitation-like EHBPs exploitation of the deemer
clause loophole-is consistent, rather than inconsistent, with ERISA's
structure.
Immediately after losing in the Fourth Circuit, Maryland enacted
168. BROwN & BROWN, supra note 129, § 2.1; DICKERSON, supra note 129, at 67-102.
169. See supra Section II.C.
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legislation with the identical purpose to the regulation that was struck
down1 70 but with language that followed the NAIC's Model Rule and
avoided the confusion surrounding the regulation's definition of some
stop-loss policies as health insurance.1 7' The statute prohibited insurance
companies from selling stop-loss policies with specific attachment points
lower than $10,000 or aggregate attachment points lower than 115% of
expected annual claims. 7 2 American Medical Security claimed that the new
statute was substantively no different than the regulation prohibited by the
Fourth Circuit; 73 the Maryland Insurance Commissioner claimed that the
statute was protected from preemption by the savings clause. 7 4 Both sides
were correct.
American Medical Security asked a federal district court to enjoin
enforcement of the statute, but the court ruled that since the statute was
newly enacted, the insurance companies would have to proceed with a new
challenge on the merits. 7 5 The company initially promised a new courtchallnge h •176
fight on the ground of ERISA preemption, 6 but it later chose instead to
withdraw from the Maryland insurance market and drop its challenge.
77
The company's general counsel said he was "not sure if anyone will want to
put the money behind a challenge to the law."'78 To date, no one has.
ERISA is a complicated statute, to be sure, but the operation of the
savings clause and the deemer clause are spelled out rather clearly: States
may regulate the sale of insurance, but their insurance regulations may not
extend to self-insured EHBPs that serve an insurance function vis-A-vis their
members but are not otherwise in the insurance business. The flawed
analysis of the Second and Fourth Circuits notwithstanding, this statutory
170. Maryland's Deputy Insurance Commissioner explained that the statute prevents
insurance companies from selling stop-loss policies to self-insured employers that "are really
a sham to avoid state regulations." Dennis Kelly, Maryland Has Begun Enforcing, BESTWIRE,
July 26, 1999 (quoting Deputy Insurance Commissioner Dennis Carroll); see also Maryland
Regulators Enforcing Law on Stop-Loss Attachments, Bus. INS.,July 26, 1999, at 1.
171. MD. CODEANN., INS. § 15-129 (1999).
172. Id.
173. SeeJerry Geisel, Stop-Loss Enforcement OK'd: But Maryland Likely to Face Additional Legal




177. See Jerry Geisel, Stop-Loss Battle To End: Insurer To Withdraw from Maryland, Ending
Challenge to Law, Bus. INS., Nov. 1, 1999, at 2.
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balance permits states to place limits on what types of stop-loss insurance
products insurance companies may sell and to whom they may sell them.
C. Further Exploiting the Savings Clause Loophole:
"Underlying Coverage" Requirements
Since the Second Circuit's decision in Travelers, all of the states that
have attempted to exploit the savings clause loophole have employed what
might be labeled a restrained approach. Specifically, those states have
required only that stop-loss insurance have minimum attachment points so
that EHBPs cannot seamlessly replace third-party health insurance with
stop-loss insurance and avoid the costs of state benefits mandates and
insurance taxes without sacrificing any of the benefits of third-party
insurance. The reason for such regulatory restraint is understandable:
Only EHBPs that purchase stop-loss insurance with very low-attachment
points are purchasing such insurance for the obvious purpose of exploiting
the deemer clause loophole and dodging the cost of state law
requirements. If states wish to use the savings clause loophole to neutralize
the deemer clause loophole, focusing only on low-attachment point stop-
loss insurance is appropriate.
Mandating minimum attachment points for stop-loss insurance is a
restrained regulatory approach because, although it makes the decision to
self-insure (and thereby avoid state health insurance mandates) less
desirable from the perspective of EHBPs, it makes that decision only
marginally less desirable. With such stop-loss insurance regulations
enacted, an EHBP that wishes to avoid the costs of state insurance
mandates must maintain some insurance risk, but it is still able to cede
most of the insurance risk to a third-party by purchasing stop-loss
insurance with the minimum permissible attachment points. Given this set
of choices, some EHBPs that would choose to self-insure and purchase
stop-loss insurance with very low attachment points are likely to decide to
purchase third-party health insurance instead, but many would choose to
purchase stop-loss insurance with higher attachment points and continue
to avoid the consequences of state insurance regulations, including
benefits mandates and premium taxes.
The minimum attachment point approach to regulation fails to
recognize that the savings clause loophole can be exploited to far greater
effect. Specifically, following the New York regulation improperly struck
down in Travelers, states could enact legislation or promulgate regulations
that prohibit insurance companies from selling any stop-loss coverage for
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losses associated with health care costs unless the underlying coverage
provided by the EHBP to its employee members includes all of the state-
mandated benefits that insurance companies must provide. Such laws
might be called "underlying coverage requirements" for stop-loss
insurance.
Much like minimum attachment point requirements, underlying
coverage requirements would be directed at the insurance practices of
insurance companies and should be protected from preemption under the
savings clause on that basis. It is true that such requirements would have
the indirect effect of preventing other entities (here, EHBPs) from doing
in concert with an insurance company what the law prohibits insurance
companies from doing. This fact, however, does not vitiate savings clause
protection for the restriction placed on insurance companies.'79 And
because such a law would not place any requirements on EHBPs, it would
not interfere with the safe harbor provided by the deemer clause.' 0
An underlying coverage requirement would render the option of self-
insuring members' health care costs far less attractive to EHBPs that
currently self-insure their members' medical costs, purchase stop-loss
insurance to reduce insurance risk, and provide their members a menu of
benefits that does not include all state mandated coverage. Such EHBPs
would have to choose between (1) maintaining their stop-loss insurance
and expanding the benefits they provide to their members to include all
state-mandated benefits, (2) purchasing third-party health insurance for
their members that includes all state-mandated benefits, or (3)
functionally self-insuring their employees' medical costs by retaining the
entire insurance risk. There is little doubt that many EHBPs that currently
self-insure and offer a limited set of benefits to their members would
choose either the first or the second option, especially if they do not have
extremely large risk pools. In other words, a likely consequence of a state
instituting an underlying coverage requirement would be that employees
who enjoy health care coverage and work for all but the largest employers
would receive the benefits mandated by the state. Such a result would be
consistent with the expectations of ERISA's drafters, who envisioned that
the type of large employers that operate in multiple states could develop a
single EHBP for all of their employees free from inconsistent state
regulations, but that states would otherwise continue to regulate health
insurance.'8 '
179. See Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans v. Miller, 123 S. Ct. 1471, 1475 (2003).
180. SeeFMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61-64 (1990).
181. See generally GAO, ISSUES AND TRENDS, supra note 102.
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D. Drawbacks to Exploiting the Savings Clause Loophole
From the perspective of state regulators, there are three primary
drawbacks to exploiting the savings clause loophole, which vary in their
nature and severity: (1) some employers might end their sponsorship of
EHBPs; (2) employers operating in multiple jurisdictions might be able to
escape the impact of the state's efforts; and (3) financially precarious
employers might drop stop-loss insurance coverage, increasing their
insolvency risk. Each of these drawbacks affects both the minimum
attachment point and the underlying coverage requirement regulatory
approach, although each is likely to have a more significant impact on
underlying coverage requirements. The first drawback should not be a
significant concern in light of policy choices already made by the state; the
second should also not be a significant concern because it could reduce
the effectiveness of attempts to exploit the loophole but would not have
independently undesirable consequences; the third should give regulators
significant pause, especially in the case of underlying coverage
requirements.
1. Loss of Benefits
The first drawback to exploiting the savings clause loophole is that
doing so runs the risk of causing some employers that currently sponsor
EHBPs to stop providing any health care coverage to their employees. No
federal or state law (with the exception of Hawaii) requires employers to
provide health care coverage as a fringe benefit;82 thirty-four percent of
the nation's employers-and forty-five percent of employers with fewer
than nine workers-do not. 1 3 The cost of mandates varies from state to
state, of course, but few doubt that they are substantial, and some estimates
suggest they can account for up to nearly one-fourth of health care claims
182. Hawaii law mandates employer-provided health coverage, see HAW. REV. STAT. § 393
(2004), but the state received an exception from the federal government for its law. See 29
U.S.C. 1144 (2000). A recently enacted California statute would have mandated that
employers with more than fifty employees provide health care coverage or pay into a state
pool to fund the cost of providing such coverage. Health Insurance Act of 2003, CA. LAB.
CODE §§ 2120-2210 (West Supp. 2004). California voters blocked the law's implementation,
however, by defeating a ballot proposition in November 2004. Jordan Rau & Evan Halper,
Election 2004, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2004, at BI. Whether the measure would have survived
ERISA preemption analysis is unclear.
183. KFF/HRET, supra note 93, at 40.
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costs. 18 4 State insurance premium taxes also increase the cost to employers
of providing third-party insurance for their employees. Faced with a choice
between providing more expensive health care coverage through the
purchase of third-party insurance, continuing to self-insure but doing so
without the safety-net of stop-loss insurance or with higher-attachment-
point stop-loss insurance, or simply dropping health care coverage from
their menu of fringe benefits entirely, some employers will-and many
might-select the last option. The ironic effect could be that the very
employees state regulators desire to protect could be left worse off.
This concern, however, is one that is broader than the issue of
employers who self-insure in order to avoid state benefits mandates or
premium taxes. State regulators face the same risk when they decide to
impose any mandate or tax on the state's insurance companies. 85 Each
mandate or tax increases the cost to employers of providing third-party
health insurance, thus increasing the risk of marginal employers dropping
their sponsorship of health insurance. By one estimate, one-fifth of small
employers that do not currently offer health care benefits to their
employees would do so if there were no benefits mandates.
8 6
A state that mandates that health insurance companies provide specific
benefits presumably has already decided that the gains to employees whose
employers provide increased coverage to meet the minimum requirements
outweigh the costs to employees whose employers elect to eliminate health
care coverage altogether. Having already accepted this trade-off, it is not
clear why a state would hesitate to impose an underlying coverage mandate
on stop-loss insurance companies (except, perhaps, if the state accepted
the risks associated with imposing benefits mandates only as a result of its
knowledge that cost-conscious employers could avoid those mandates
without dropping coverage by becoming self-insured and purchasing stop-
loss coverage). Put another way, if a state fears that imposing an underlying
coverage mandate will cause many employers to cancel their EHBPs, it
184. According to a GAO study, Virginia's mandated benefits account for twelve percent
of group health insurance claims, Maryland mandated benefits account for twenty-two
percent of claims, and Iowa mandated benefits only account for only five percent of claims.
U.S. GEN. AccOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-96-161, HEALTH INSURANCE REGULATION:
VARYING STATE REQUIREMENTS AFFECT COST OF INSURANCE 11 (1996).
185. They face a similar concern when they decide whether to raise the state minimum
wage, knowing that some employers might lay-off low-wage employees rather than increase
wages to comply with the new minimum. Robert A. Hillman, The Rhetoric of Legal Backfire, 43
B.C. L. REV. 819, 852 (2002); Daniel Shaviro, The Minimum Wage, the Earned Income Tax
Credit, and Optimal Subsidy Policy, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 405 (1997).
186. SeeJensen, supra note 42.
V:I1 (2005)
44
Yale Journal of Health Policy, Law, and Ethics, Vol. 5 [2005], Iss. 1, Art. 2
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjhple/vol5/iss1/2
THE BATTLE OVER SELF-INSURED HEALTH PLANS
should reconsider the efficacy of its benefits mandates.
2. Jurisdiction Jumping
A second drawback to regulating stop-loss insurance providers is that,
to the extent that only some states choose to enact such regulations, they
might be relatively easy for EHBPs of some multi-state employers to avoid.
States' authority to regulate insurance allows them to set the terms and
conditions of insurance policies issued in their state. A typical state statute
prohibits any person from transacting "a business of insurance in" or
"relative to a subject of insurance resident, located or to be performed in"
the state without complying with applicable provisions of state law. '87 Thus,
State A can require that insurance companies that sell health insurance
policies covering employees residing in that state comply with applicable
state requirements."" But State A lacks authority over the terms and
conditions of policies an insurer sells to customers that reside in State B.' 89
If an employer's entire business operation is located in State B, State A
should have little concern with the terms of a stop-loss insurance policy
that the employer purchases. Difficult questions arise, however, when an
employer's business operates in multiple states. An employer with
headquarters in State A, its major plant in State B, and employees spread
out over States A, B, C, D, might respond to the imposition of an
underlying coverage mandate on stop-loss insurers in State A by
purchasing its stop-loss policy in State B from a company duly licensed
there. It is unclear whether, and in what precise cases, State A could assert
regulatory authority over the terms and conditions of the stop-loss policy
under these circumstances-complicated choice of law questions are
involved. 190
187. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. § 20-107 (2004); FLA. STAT. ch. 624.11 (2004); IDAHO CODE
§ 41-113 (2004); NEv. REv. STAT. 679A.150 (2004); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 26-1-103 (2004).
188. See Guardian Life Co. of Am. v. Ins. Comm'r, 446 A.2d 1140 (Md. App. 1982)
(holding that a group health insurance policy sold by a Rhode Island insurance company to
a Maryland employer and covering Maryland employees must comply with Maryland
insurance requirements notwithstanding that the master policy was delivered by the
insurance company to a Rhode Island trustee rather than to the employer in Maryland).
189. Rizzo v. Price, 294 A.2d 541 (Conn. 1972); Standard Ins. Co. v. Sturdevant, 566 P.2d
52 (Mont. 1977). For statutes, see CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-1, 38-69, 38-71, 38-72 (2003); MASS.
GEN. LAwS ANN. ch. 175, § 162; (1999); and N.Y. INS. LAw § 2114, 2115(a), 2116 (2004).
190. See generally Banks McDowell, Choice of Law in Insurance: Conflicts Methodology To
Minimize Discrimination Among Policyholders, 23 CONN. L. REv. 117 (1990) (discussing the
complex choice of law problems that arise when multiple states have an interest in the law
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The possibility that employers operating in multiple states might avoid
the effects of stop-loss insurance in one of those states by contracting for
stop-loss insurance in a different jurisdiction suggests that the savings
clause loophole might be somewhat narrower than regulators wish it would
be. But the possibility that exploiting the savings clause loophole might not
be a complete response to all employers that exploit the deemer clause
loophole does not logically provide an argument against regulators taking
action. At the very least, minimum attachment point regulations and
underlying coverage mandates would have their desired effect on
employers whose operations are located in a single state, and employers
with multiple-state operations best able to avoid the consequences of such
regulations will tend to be larger employers less likely to use low-
attachment-point stop-loss insurance for the sole purpose of avoiding state
benefits mandates.
3. Risk of Insolvency
The third drawback to regulating stop-loss insurance is that some
employers might choose to continue to operate a self-insured EHBP but
without stop-loss coverage. This risk is especially great if the state institutes
an underlying coverage requirement rather than merely a minimum
attachment point. Self-funded employers without stop-loss insurance
expose their employees to an increased risk of plan insolvency. ERISA
imposes no federal financial solvency requirements on EHBPs,1 91 and the
deemer clause prevents states from imposing any on them. A catastrophic
medical expense incurred by a participant in a self-funded EHBP without
stop-loss coverage could cause the plan to become insolvent, leaving plan
members without coverage or increasing the financial burden on any state-
sponsored fund that might insure such insolvencies or provide health
benefits to the uninsured. 192 That the potential for self-insured EHBPs to
governing an insurance contract).
191. In contrast, ERISA does include detailed requirements for employer-sponsored
pension plans to insure their solvency. Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient' Rights Despite
ERISA: Will the Supreme Court Allow States To Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REv. 951, 975
(2000).
192. To cover members of an insured EHBP that becomes insolvent, states provide
health guaranty associations. All states have enacted statutes based on an NAIC Model Law
that requires insurance companies tojoin as a condition of transacting business in the state.
The association is run by a board of directors, who determine the action necessary to cover
individuals who lose health care coverage as a result of their company's insolvency. This
action can range between assuming coverage for individuals from the guaranty fund to
V:I1 (2005)
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become insolvent is of concern to state regulators is demonstrated by the
fact that all states have solvency requirements for insurance 
companies. 93
This concern is also demonstrated by the fact that many states require self-
insured employee health benefit plans that are exempt from ERISA
preemption for various reasons to purchase stop-loss insurance. 
194
Unlike the drawbacks of regulating stop-loss insurance described
above, the increased risk of EHBP insolvency is an independent negative
consequence of regulation that regulators must balance against the
benefits of encouraging more employers to provide state mandated
benefits as part of their self-insured plans or choosing to purchase third-
party insurance subject to those state mandates.
CONCLUSION
For better or worse, ERISA creates a two-tiered structure for the
regulation of employer-provided health insurance benefits. Employers who
dispersing the individuals between member insurance companies. LIFE AND HEALTH INS.
GuARARay ASS'N MODEL AcT (Nat'l Ass'n of Ins. Comm'rs 2003). For examples of relevant
state regulations, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. §§ 20-681 to 20-695 (2004); CAL. INS. CODE § 1067.18
(2004); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 10-20-101 to 10-12-120 (2004); 215 ILL. COMP. STATS. 5/531-01
to 5/531-19 (2004); MD. CODE ANN., INS. §§ 9-401 to 9-419 (2004); Mo. REv. STAT §§
376.715- 376.758 (2004); N.Y. INS. LAWS §§ 7701- 7718 (2004).
193. See, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 3, § 21.241 (2003) (placing limitations on the type
of investments and the percentage of total investments that health insurers can place in
those investments); id. § 21.320 (regulating the amount and type of reserves that insurance
companies must retain); CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 38a-214-4 (2003) (requiring health
insurers to retain a certain amount in contingency reserves); FLA. ADMIN CODE r. 4-137.001
(describing insurer reporting requirements); IOWA ADMIN. CODE r. 19141.11(514B)
(establishing minimum net worth for HMOs); MD. REGS. CODE tit. 31, § 12.01 (setting HMO
fiscal requirements).
194. For example, Georgia, South Carolina, New Mexico, Minnesota, among others,
require multiple-employer health benefits plans, which are exempt from ERISA's
preemption protection against state laws, to buy stop-loss insurance. GA. COMP. R. & REGS. r.
120-2-50-.05 (2003) ("[A] multiple employer self-insured health plan is required to obtain
individual and aggregate stop-loss coverage from an insurer authorized to transact business
in Georgia); MINN. R. 2765.1300 (2002) (requiring every joint self-insurance arrangement
to carry both individual and aggregate stop-loss insurance); N.M. ADMIN. CODE tit. 13 §
19.4.16 (2004) ("[E]very MEWA shall have at all times individual and aggregate excess stop-
loss coverage from an insurer authorized to transact insurance in the state of New
Mexico."); S.C. CODE ANN. REGs. 69-42. Other states, Wisconsin, require local government
units to obtain stop-loss insurance to cover their self-insured plans. WiS. ADMIN. CODE INS.
8.11 (2003).
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purchase third-party health insurance are indirectly subject to state
regulation because the savings clause exempts state regulation of insurance
companies from federal preemption. Employers who self-insure their
EHBP are not subject to state level requirements, because the deemer
clause prevents state regulators from treating EHBPs like insurance
companies. This statutory structure, reinforced by recent Supreme Court
rulings expanding the scope of the savings clause, provides an incentive for
employers who wish to avoid state mandated benefits and premium taxes
but who do not wish to bear insurance risk to self-insure their EHBPs and
purchase low attachment point stop-loss insurance. This approach exploits
a loophole in ERISA, but one that is unavoidable in light of the text of the
deemer clause; it would be improper for courts to judicially close the
loophole in the light of ERISA's text and structure.
The savings clause, however, provides regulators with a loophole of
their own that they may exploit to reduce the desirability to employers of
exploiting the deemer clause loophole. Properly interpreted, the savings
clause gives states the right to prevent insurance companies from selling
low attachment point stop-loss policies to EHBPs, or even from selling stop-
loss policies with any attachment point to EHBPs that do not provide state-
mandated benefits for health insurance programs in general. Rather than
decrying the consequences of courts properly interpreting the deemer
clause, regulators need to decide whether the benefits of exercising their
power over stop-loss insurance providers granted by the savings clause
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